IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY OR INSECURITY?: THE POTENTIAL INDEFINITE DETENTION
1
OF NON-CITIZEN CERTIFIED TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN
THE AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

“Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that
one be violated?”2
INTRODUCTION
The horrific terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 left millions of people, both in the
United States and throughout the world, feeling vulnerable in a way that we have never felt
before. The unprecedented acts of terror created a type of public fear that has not before been
present with other national threats of security. The immeasurable damage of the events to the
human spirit and our sense of security left many individuals searching for reassurance from their
governments that these types of atrocities could never, and would never, transpire again.
Consequently, consistent with what has historically occurred immediately following most major
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The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2002), defines “aliens” as all
people who are not nationals of the United States. It then uses the term “alien” throughout the
Act consistently and frequently. Because the term “alien” connotes dehumanizing qualities of
strangeness and inferiority, this Comment will use the term “non-citizen” rather than “alien.”
This term conveys essentially the same technical meaning without the potentially offensive
associations.
2
See COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (Roy P. Basker ed., 1953). Abraham
Lincoln was the first president to essentially ignore Congress’ power and freely direct the nation
as a “dictator.” Faced with the emergency of the Civil War, Lincoln enlarged the Army and
Navy beyond the authorization of Congress and spent money without Congressional approval.
In addition, he suspended the writ of habeas corpus which enable the executive branch to arrest
“disloyal” citizens and anyone who sympathized with the South without a trial. The Supreme
Court justified President Lincoln’s extraordinary conception of executive power based upon the
emergency circumstances. See Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An
Examination of President Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 455,
465 (2002) (discussing the roles of different presidents in times of war and crisis).

terrorist events, legislatures around the world3 embarked on the task of passing tougher antiterrorism laws in a frenzy of activity.4
The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, under the premise of
national security, responded to the events of September 11, 2001 by immediately enacting
comprehensive responsive and reactionary legislation. The measures adopted by the
governments of these two nations, while allaying some of the fears of their citizens and possibly
providing them with a greater sense of security without sacrificing their own liberty, have in turn
sacrificed the liberty of non-citizens. Among other things, this trade-off has provided the United
States and the United Kingdom with the discretion and the authority to indefinitely detain those
non-citizens certified as terrorists under the new legislation.5 This targeting of non-citizens
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For example, several countries of the European Union, in addition to the United Kingdom
which is at the focus of this Comment, passed anti-terrorism measures in the wake of September
11, 2001. France expanded the powers of police to search private property without a warrant and
Germany engaged in religious profiling of suspected terrorists. See Jeffery Rosen, Liberty is
winning …so far, Congress and courts are resisting the Bush administration’s efforts to restrict
civil liberties in the name of national security, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2002.
4
See Gregory C. Clark, History Repeating Itself: The (D)evolution of Recent British and
American Antiterrorist Legislation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.247, 247- 48 (1999) (comparing the
past efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom to combat terrorism). One of the
memorable phrases that was coined during the troubles in Northern Ireland in the past is the
“politics of the last atrocity.” It refers to people taking advantage of the last atrocity to push a
political agency or to score political points. See id. Similarly, the following the Oklahoma City
bombing in the United States the legislature passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act with the goal of making the United States a no-support-for-terrorism zone. See id.
See also supra note 40 (discussing terrorist events in the United States prior to September 11,
2001).
5
“Certified” means that either the Attorney General in the United States or the Secretary of
Labor of the United Kingdom has deemed a particular individual in their respective countries as
a suspected terrorist. What is so striking about both the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 and
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is the tremendous power each piece of legislation
placed in the discretion of the government to certify an individual as a terrorist, which leads to
automatic preventative detention. This certification does not require a court order and is
permissible upon a reasonable belief held by the executive that the individual is a terrorist. The
certification of suspected terrorists will be discussed further in Part III of this Comment.
2

through the use of anti-terrorism legislation by the governments of the United States and the
United Kingdom, while not unprecedented or necessarily radical given the atrocities committed
against the citizens of these nations,6 does however raise serious concerns regarding exactly how
far these nations can proceed in the name of national security.

6

Historically, the governments of both the United States and the United Kingdom have curtailed
civil liberties in times of national emergency, finding the state interest in national security to be
paramount to competing interests. During World War I, the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of Eugene Debs for expressing his opposition to the war, refusing to recognize his
violent anti-war advocacy as speech protected by the First Amendment. See Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). See also Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding
conviction of an individual for distributing anti-war circulars). Likewise, during World War II
following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Supreme Court upheld an Executive Order
mandating the internment of more than 100,000 Japanese immigrants based on their ancestry,
refusing to recognize their preventive detention as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945). And during the Cold War, the United
States was quick to target anyone suspected of being associated with the Communist Party. See
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
Similarly, the United Kingdom has been quick to ignore and suspend civil liberties during
periods of crisis. During World War II, almost 2,000 persons, both citizens and non-citizens
alike, were interned in the United Kingdom without formal charges and without trial. PADDY
HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY, PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCE OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM
ACTS IN BRITAIN 45 (1993). Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s ongoing struggle with
terrorism in Northern Ireland has often resulted in the suspension of civil liberties during
particularly unstable periods. See generally id. (providing a history of the United Kingdom’s
response to terrorism in Northern Ireland and discussing how these responses have resulted in the
erosion of civil liberties); DONALD W. JACKSON, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997) (studying the legal conflicts and transitions
between the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights). For example, during
the infamous “Bloody Sunday,” British paratroopers killed innocent and unarmed protesters in
Northern Ireland who were participating in a civil rights demonstration. See LAURA K.
DONAHUE, COUNTER-TERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 19222000 121 (2000); Clark, supra note 4, at 253. After this horrific event, Ireland erupted in
violence and chaos. In response, the United Kingdom suspended the Parliament of Northern
Ireland and resorted to direct control of the province. See id. at 253-54. In addition, the United
Kingdom passed two important pieces of legislation, the Emergency Powers Act and the
Prevention of Terrorism Act. These Acts and their effect on civil liberties will be discussed in
more detail in Part II of this Comment.
An in-depth examination of the curtailment of civil liberties of both the United States and
the United Kingdom during times of crisis is well-beyond the scope of this Comment. This issue
has, however, been addressed by numerous other scholars. For more information, see generally
Mathews, supra note 2 (comparing the recent curtailment of civil liberties by President Bush
3

An in-depth complete analysis and summary of the extensive anti-terrorism legislation
enacted in the United States and the United Kingdom after September 11, 2001 is well beyond
the scope of this Comment and has been extensively discussed elsewhere.7 These legislative
acts, while undoubtedly sudden responses of both governments to the terrorist attacks, served as
catchalls for many initiatives, a majority of which are non-controversial. This Comment will
examine a select few of those sections of the United States United and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 20018 (Patriot

with the past policies of notable United States Presidents); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN.
L.J. 953 (2002) (addressing the United States treatment of non-citizens during times of crisis,
both past and present); JACKSON, supra (studying violations by the United Kingdom of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms);
HILLYARD, supra (exploring the powers of the United Kingdom during times of crisis and
describing how the entire Northern Ireland community has been targeted and criminalized by
these powers).
7
For a discussion of the Patriot Act in its entirety see generally Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking
Civil Liberties: The USA Patriot Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933 (2002) (discussing the
various provisions of the Patriot Act and their potential consequences for civil liberties);
Amnesty International, United States of America, Amnesty International’s Concerns Regarding
Post September 11 Detentions in the USA, March 2002, available at www.amnesty.com
(outlining various provisions of the Patriot Act and discussing their implications for civil
liberties); Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435 (2002) (examining
the Patriot Act’s expansion of government authority and its impact on civil liberties). For an
analogous discussion of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 see generally Virginia
Helen Henning, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: Has the United Kingdom Made a
Valid Derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1263 (2002) (discussing whether the broad powers authorized to the United Kingdom under
ATCSA are consistent with their obligations under the European Human Rights Convention);
Amnesty International, United Kingdom, Rights Denied: the UK’s Response to 11 September
2001, Sept. 5, 2002, available at www.amnesty.com (expressing deep concern about serious
human rights violations that have taken place as a consequence of the United Kingdom’s
response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States); Adam Tomkins,
Legislating against Terror: The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, PUBLIC LAW,
2002, at 205 (discussing the various measures of ATCSA); Sadiq Khan, Anti-Terrorism Crime
and Security Act 2001, SOLICITORS JOURNAL, Jan. 11, 2002, at 10; Michael Zander, The AntiTerrorism Bill—What Happened?, NEW LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 21, 2001, at 1880.
8
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. Law No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
4

Act) and the United Kingdom’s Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 20019 (ATCSA) which
have proven extremely controversial. These provisions stand out as radical in the degree in
which they sacrifice freedom in the name of national security. More specifically, the focus will
be limited to §§ 411 and 412 of the Patriot Act and Part 4 of ATCSA, which provide the
governments of the United States and United Kingdom with extensive powers to take into
custody and detain non-citizens suspected of terrorism.10 Each piece of legislation respectively
enables the Attorney General of the United States and the Secretary of State of the United
Kingdom to certify any non-citizen whom he suspects to be a terrorist.11 Upon certification, the
provisions which will be examined then require the mandatory detention of these individuals
until the non-citizen is either ordered removed from the country or found not to be removable,
and authorize the potential indefinite detention of these non-citizens who have been certified as
terrorists.12
Part I of this Comment will introduce the advantages and disadvantages that accompany
the various theories of mandatory detention. Keeping these theories in mind, Part II will begin
by examining the major points of difference between the governments of the United States and
the United Kingdom. An understanding of the structural differences between the two
governments is essential before embarking on a comparison of their anti-terrorist legislation,
both past and present. This Part will then lay the statutory framework for the Patriot Act and
ATCSA by providing a brief history of the indefinite detention of non-citizen suspected terrorists
in the United States and the United Kingdom prior to September 11, 2001. In examining the
9

Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.).
See United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, §§ 411, 412 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.); Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, §§ 21-30.
11
See id. at § 412; § 21.
10
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past efforts of these countries to combat terrorism prior to September 11, 2001 and by
establishing exactly what the law was prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act and ATCSA, we
can better understand the changes these pieces of legislation authorized.
Part III will then outline and compare specific detention provisions of the Patriot Act and
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001which are at the crux of this Comment. The
comparison will first examine the definition of a terrorist and exactly what qualifies as a terrorist
activity under each of the respected acts in an effort to explain precisely how a decision is made
to certify a non-citizen as a terrorist. This Part will then look at the implications of being
certified a terrorist as it pertains to custody, release, and commencement of proceedings and
analyze the detention provisions and the potential concerns that each piece of legislation raises.
In addition, this Part will also demonstrate how each act purports to place a limitation on
detention by examining the ability of certified terrorists under each piece of legislation to obtain
judicial review of their certification. Finally, this Part will examine and analyze the various
arguments which have been made against each of the pieces of legislation. As this Part will
establish, while each act presumably limits the amount of time a certified non-citizen terrorist
can be detained, a close reading reveals that indefinite detention is a possibility. Nevertheless,
despite the prospect of indefinite detention, this analysis and comparison of each piece of
legislation will also illustrate just how reasoned a response the Patriot Act is to protect the United
States from the threats of terrorists and terrorism. On the contrary, as will be explained, ATCSA
cannot be similarly justified.
Part IV will first posit how the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) would rule
on the constitutionality of the detention provisions of the Patriot Act and similarly whether the
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See id. at § 412; §§ 21-29.
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European Court of Human Rights13 (European Court) would find that the United Kingdom, in
enacting the detention provisions of ATCSA, has violated its obligation to protect human rights
and democratic principles under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).14 While
each court has yet to rule on such issues, their previous decisions with regards to the detention
provisions enacted in past legislation and their decisions during times of national crisis can guide
us in making such an inquiry. Ultimately, the question for both the Supreme Court and the
European Court is whether these governments can sacrifice the liberties of others for the
purported security of the rest of their citizens. While it is probable that the controversial
provisions of the Patriot Act will be upheld by the Supreme Court, it is questionable as to
whether the European Court would similarly uphold the detention provisions of ATCSA.
Irrespective of how each court would rule, however, this Comment will conclude that the
detention strategy is inherently flawed and is unlikely, at least in the long term, to achieve the
goals of preventing another terrorist attack.
Finally, this Comment will argue that despite the indisputable curtailment on the civil
liberties of non-citizens under both acts, the detention provisions embodied in the Patriot Act
represent a reasoned and proportionate response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, while
those under ATCSA cannot be similarly justified. Even though the Patriot Act has come under
heavy fire in both the United States and throughout the world, in researching the state of liberty
and security after September 11, it is astounding to observe how restrained the legal response of
the United States appears when contrasted with that of the United Kingdom. Although the
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The European Court of Human Rights was established under Article 19 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The Court will be discussed in more detail in Parts III and IV of
this Comment.
14
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
7

United Kingdom was not directly attacked, the detention provisions of ATCSA are far more
sweeping than those authorized under the Patriot Act. In comparing the legislative responses of
both the United States and the United Kingdom to the terrorist attacks it becomes apparent that
while the Patriot Act is a rational legislative response which includes sufficient protections to
defend those subject to the Patriot Act’s detention provisions, the unrestrained powers of the
British government under ATCSA are neither strictly necessary, nor balanced, nor accompanied
by adequate procedural safeguards to protect the rights of those detained under Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001.
I. THEORIES OF MANDATORY DETENTION
An appropriate starting point in the comparison of the detention provisions of the Patriot
Act and ATCSA is a brief analysis of the basic theories which underlie the mandatory detention
of non-citizens. In this analysis, it is essential to compare the benefits of categorical, mandatory
detention with the benefits of case-by-case determinations which take into consideration the
particular individual’s potential threat to public safety and the person’s likelihood of
disappearing altogether Essentially, do the benefits of mandatory detention outweigh the costs?
First, mandatory detention saves money because it avoids the expense of individualized
hearings.15 The government has limited resources and cannot afford to do a case- by- case
adjudication of each non-citizen who is suspected of being a terrorist.16 Second, mandatory
detention diminishes the possibility of errors that arise when a detention determination is done on
a case-by- case basis.17 Predictions about the threat of a person to the public’s safety or the
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Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 544 (1999).
16
Id. at 545-46.
17
Id.
8

individual’s likeliness to disappearance are inherently risky.18 Often in the course of an
individualized hearing, not all the evidence will be discovered or presented and the findings of
fact may not be accurate.19 In essence, mandatory detention, by eliminating the risk of
prosecutorial error, protects the public more thoroughly. Finally, mandatory detention deters
further immigration violations.20 It both advances the government’s interest in ensuring the
removal of aliens who are ordered deported and sends a message to those non-citizens
contemplating criminal or terrorist in the United States.21 Arguably, if suspected terrorists are
aware that they could be detained indefinitely, they may be discouraged from attempting to enter
the United States illegally or from filing frivolous asylum claims.22
Nevertheless, there are shortcomings to the abovementioned theories. Inevitably,
mandatory detention will lead to a number of false positives.23 In other words, some of the
people detained may or may not be suspected terrorists. Furthermore, these individuals may not
pose any threat to the public’s safety and may not abscond upon release. Some disadvantages
include the deprivation of individual liberty; the inability to work and socialize; and isolation
from friends, family, and the community. In addition, the individual suffers an economic loss by
being unable to work, which results in the loss of income tax revenue that the detained person’s
employment would have generated, as well as the increased public costs of providing detention
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Id.
Id. at 546.
20
Id.
21
Id; see also Daniel R. Dinger, When We Cannot Deport, is it Fair to Detain? An Analysis of
the Rights of Deportable Aliens Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(A)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim
Procedures Governing Detentions, BYU L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
22
Legomsky, supra note 15, at 546.
23
Id. at 545-46.
19
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and possibly supporting the detainee’s dependents through public assistance programs. 24 These
losses combined constitute a great waste of both human and financial resources.25
On the other hand, and even more significantly, many individuals who do not fall
squarely within any of the categories of persons who are automatically subject to mandatory
detention may in fact still present a real danger of absconding or pose a real threat to public
safety.26 Every time the INS is required to detain a person who in fact poses no threat or danger
at all, it has one fewer detention spot available for a person who poses a threat and whom the
INS would have had the discretion to detain.27 This factor is of great consequence. At any one
time, there are approximately 125,000 persons in removal proceedings, but the INS has only
14,000 detention beds.28 To the extent that mandatory detention is intended to minimize false
negatives, therefore, the strategy might even be counterproductive.29
Thus, it appears that in least in certain cases, mandatory detention serves a useful
enforcement function. There are, however, great drawbacks that accompany mandatory
detention. With the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory detention in mind, we now turn
the statutory framework that existed in regards to the mandatory detention of non-citizens
suspected of terrorism in the United States and the United Kingdom prior to the tragic events of
September 11, 2001.

24

Id. at 546-47.
Id.
26
Id. at 547.
27
Id. at 547.
28
Id.
29
Id.
25
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II. MANDATORY DETENTION OF NON-CITIZENS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
A comparison of any type of legislation enacted by two independent governments must
begin with a basic understanding of how each government works and an explanation of the
fundamental differences between the two systems. Unlike the United States, the United
Kingdom does not have a supreme written Constitution and an established bill of rights.30 Thus,
the United Kingdom is a unitary state with a parliament whose legislative power is, legally
speaking, unfettered, since there is no over-riding written constitution limiting its powers, and no
power in the courts to invalidate an Act of Parliament.31 In addition, the principle of separation
of powers, while underlying the structure of the United States government, is unheard of within
the British system.32 In the absence of a federal system of government, the United Kingdom
merges the functions of the executive and the legislature and does not provide the power of
judicial review of primary legislation.33
These differing frameworks, more specifically, the absence of a power of judicial review
of primary legislation, significantly affect the breadth of legislation and the powers afforded to

30

See Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon Mandating a Unified
International Response, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 685, 695 (1999); Roberta Smith,
America Tries to Come to Terms with Terrorism: The United States Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. British Anti-Terrorism Law and International Response, 5
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 249, 283 (1997); D.G.T. Williams, Aspects of Equal Protection in
the United Kingdom, 59 TULANE L. REV. 959, 960 (1985). For a more in-depth examination of
the nature and the source of the unique constitution of the United Kingdom see Douglas W.
Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 329 (2002).
31
See David Bonner, United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism, in
WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 171-72 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds.,
1993). For an in-depth analysis of British law, the practice of the constitution and the overall
structure of the government of the United Kingdom, see generally A.W. BRADLEY & K.D.
EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1997).
32
See Carberry, supra note 30, at 695.
33
Id.
11

government officials.34 This is clearly apparent and important when examining the antiterrorism legislation enacted by the two governments over the years. Due to the absence of a
formalized written constitution or a formal bill of rights, British law has consistently granted
more power to its government to control terrorism.35 This is because, as previously discussed, in
the United Kingdom there is essentially a single principle, parliamentary sovereignty, which
allows Parliament, technically the monarch, Lords, and Commons, unlimited power to alter both
the substance and procedure of government.36 This has resulted in the enactment of numerous
specific anti-terrorism measures in response to the ongoing conflict between Catholics and
Protestants in Northern Ireland.37 Nevertheless, the power is not unchecked. The European
Court of Human Rights monitors the British anti-terrorism provisions and places pressure on the
government to respect basic human rights and liberties.38

34

Id. Even in the absence of judicial review, however, British judges are familiar with the
exercise of a leading constitutional rule: the early strands of authority for modern concepts of
judicial review date back from seventeenth-century England. For a further discussion of the
concept of judicial review in the United Kingdom see Williams, supra note 30, at 964. See also
BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 31, at 803-29.
35
See Carberry, supra note 30, at 695. Examples of this type power granted to the British
government to combat terrorism will be discussed in more detail in Part II.B of this Comment.
36
See Barry Jones & Michael Keating, Nations, Regions, and Europe: The UK Experience, in
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONS 89 (Barry Jones & Michael Keating, eds., 1995).
37
See id. For an examination of the vast legislation passed by the United Kingdom in an effort
to address the conflict in Northern Ireland see generally DONAHUE, supra note 6 (discussing the
exercise of extraordinary state power by the United Kingdom in Ireland and the repeated
codification of emergency powers as a means to retain control over Ireland.) In addition, Part
II.B of this Comment will provide a summary of the United Kingdom’s anti-t errorism legislation
prior to September 11, 2001.
38
See Carberry, supra note 30, at 695; Smith, supra note 30, at 283. The rulings of the European
Court of Human Rights are binding on the United Kingdom as the United Kingdom has ratified
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(ECHR) and fully accepted its control mechanism. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom, although
obligated under ECHR, has consistently violated the treaty. For an in-depth analysis of the
United Kingdom and its various violations of ECHR see generally JACKSON, supra note 6
(closely examining select violations of ECHR by the United Kingdom).
12

Conversely, the United States has historically addressed terrorism on a less formalized
basis than the United Kingdom.39 Instead of creating specific anti-terrorism legislation, the
United States has generally incorporated anti-terrorism measures into pre-existing laws.40 While
the lack of explicit anti-terrorism legislation can partially be attributed to our unique government
structure, it is primarily the consequence of the United States’ limited exposure to domestic
terrorism. Unlike the British, it was not until the 1990s that Americans were attacked at home
and realized that they were no longer insulated from terrorism within their borders. Prior to this
time, the government could not justify, nor did it need to enact, anti-terrorist legislation at the
expense of civil liberties and rights. Beginning with the bombing on the World Trade Center in
1993 and culminating with the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, however, the government
enacted comprehensive legislation which would address terrorism both domestically and
internationally.41 These tragedies committed on our own soil brought our vulnerabilities to the
forefront and brought home to Americans the reality that they too are susceptible to acts of
terrorism. While it would be another six years until the devastating September 11, 2001 attacks,
these events resulted in a dramatic shift in the attitudes of both the American people and
Congress towards terrorism.
Irrespective of the structural differences of the governments of the United States and the
United Kingdom and regardless of the anti-terrorism legislation enacted by each of these
governments in the past, it is probable that nothing could have prepared either nation for the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Before focusing on the legislative reactions to
39

See Smith, supra note 30, at 283-84.
Id.
41
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW POLICY 843 (2002). Although a
United States citizen perpetrated the attack on the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma
40
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September 11, 2001, however, to better explain how the newly granted detention powers
authorized by the Patriot Act and Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 have altered the
landscape of non-citizen detention law in the United States and the United Kingdom, it is useful
to first survey the rules governing detention as they existed prior to September 11, 2001 as well
as to examine the key judicial decisions interpreting and applying them. Only then can we
contemplate whether these governments have proceeded too far in sacrificing the freedoms of
non-citizens in the name of national security.
A. The Mandatory Detention of Non-Citizen Terrorists in the United States Prior to September
11, 2001
Beginning in the 1950s and lasting through the 1980s, the legal structure governing the
detention of non-citizens was relatively clear and understood. First, a critical distinction was
made between resident non-citizens who had obtained entry into the United States, but who had
yet to qualify for naturalization (including both legal and illegal resident non-citizens), and
excludable non-citizens who had been detained at the border (including non-citizens who had
been paroled into the United States).42 If a non-citizen was deemed excludable, and thus was
stopped at the port of entry, the individual could be detained indefinitely.43 Conversely, if the

City, Congress seized the opportunity to enact broad terrorism legislation to quell the public’s
fear of both citizen and non-citizen terrorists alike. See id.
42
See M. Gavan Montague, Should Aliens be Indefinitely Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231?
Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under Renewed Scrutiny, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1439, 1441-42 (2001). Under INA § 212(d)(5), the Attorney General has the discretion to
“parole” a non-citizen into the United States temporarily. Until 1980 the parole provision was
often used to allow groups of refugees into the United States for indefinite periods. Today the
provision is typically used to either enable non-citizens to come to the United States temporarily
for urgent personal reasons or to allow applicants for admission to avoid detention pending
determinations of admissibility. A grant of parole, however, is not considered an admission. See
LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 137.
43
See Harvard Law Review Association, Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of
Deportable Aliens, 155 HARV. L. REV. 1915, 1919 (2002) [hereinafterPlight of the Tempest Tost]; David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The
14

non-citizen was found deportable, meaning that the non-citizen had already procured entry into
the United States, he could only be held for six months.44 This distinction was extremely
important because at that time it was widely held that the Constitution afforded greater rights to
non-citizens already in the United States than to those who had only just arrived at the border.45
After the expiration of this six-month period, the deportable non-citizen could be released.46 The
release of the non-citizen, however, was often conditioned on certain supervision and reporting
requirements.47

Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 52 (2001). See also United States
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (ruling that excludable non-citizens had
no right of a judicial audit, applying independent constitutional standards, of the procedures used
in exclusion proceedings: “Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953) (authorizing the indefinite detention of a non-citizen on Ellis Island).
44
See Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1919; Martin, supra note 43, at 52.
45
See Martin, supra note 43, at 52.
46
See id. Several cases found an equitable exception suspending the running of the six-month
period id the non-citizen in anyway delayed the process of securing traveling documents. See,
e.g., Dor v. District Director, 891 F.2d 997, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1989); Balogun v. INS, 9 F.3d 347,
351 (5th Cir. 1993).
47
An example of immigration parole can be best understood through the example of the
Marielitos. In 1980 the Cuban government opened up their port of Mariel for American citizens
or residents to come and retrieve their family members. In addition, the Cuban government
emptied their prisons and placed many ex-prisoners on boats to the United States. The ensuing
boatlift brought over 120,000 Cubans to the United States. Upon arrival, these non-citizens were
excludable, but the political situation did not enable the United States to return them to Cuba. As
the sheer number of people made it impossible for the INS to process each non-citizen, virtually
all of the Marielitos were released, but on immigration parole. Problems with the indefinite
detention of these individuals arose, however, when these Marielitos violated the conditions of
their parole and began committing crimes after their release. While the Supreme Court never
ruled on the detention of these individuals, numerous District Courts upheld the indefinite
detention of the Marielitos. See Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1997); Garcia- Mir v.
Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir.
1984). For more information on the plight of the Marielitos see generally MARIO A. RIVERA,
DECISION AND STRUCTURE: U.S. REFUGEE POLICY IN MARIEL CRISIS (1991) (examining the
Cuban boatlift and its catastrophic consequences for the United States); see also LEGOMSKY,
supra note 41, at 61-65.
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In 1988, however, the statutory picture became considerably more complicated when
Congress began to mandate the detention of particular undesirable non-citizens. For example, in
response to public outrage over high crime rates and increased drug consumption, Congress
enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198848 (ADAA), which amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act49 (INA), to mandate detention of any alien convicted of an “aggravated
felony.”50
1. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
ADAA required the Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) to hold non-citizens in
detention throughout deportation hearings and until actual removal.51 As one could expect, this
legislation was controversial and was consequently challenged by non-citizens who were
lawfully admitted prior to the enactment of ADAA and who had finished serving their criminal
sentences.52 These individuals were now not only subject to deportation, but also faced the
possibility of potential indefinite detention as a result of their previous criminal convictions.
Many courts struggled with ADAA and split on the validity of this legislation, with only a few
upholding the legislation and many more holding that the non-citizens were entitled to an
individualized consideration of release.53 Shortly thereafter, Congress bowed to pressure and

48

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
49
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2002).
50
Id. § 7343(a)(4) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)). The ADAA defined aggravated felonies as
crimes involving murder, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices,
and attempts or conspiracies to commit such crimes in the United States. Id. § 7342 (amending 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)). See also Dawn Marie Johnson, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating
Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477, 480-81 (2001)
(discussing the effects of the ADAA on immigration law and deportation proceedings).
51
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 7343(a)(4) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)).
52
See Martin, supra note 43, at 61.
53
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that the statute violated both
substantive and procedural due process by denying the non-citizen any opportunity to prove that
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liberalized the policy slightly by allowing the release of non-citizens who had been legally
admitted into the United States and who could demonstrate that they did not pose a flight risk or
danger to the community.54 Even with the amendments, however, the statute still permitted, and
in some cases required, post-order detention of non-citizens beyond the six-month period for
those aggravated felons who could not be removed.55 Furthermore, those non- citizens who were
not lawfully admitted, or who were excludable, had no right to attempt to demonstrate
qualification for release. 56 Nevertheless, the decisions considering whether these detentions

he was neither likely to abscond or a danger to the community); Va Peng Joe v. Thornburgh,
1990 WL 167457 (D.Mass.1990) (striking down the statute on both substantive and procedural
due process grounds); Kellman v. District Director, 750 F.Supp 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(invalidating the statute). But see Morrobel v. Thornburgh, 744 F.Supp. 725 (E.D.Va.1990)
(finding that the statute did not violate substantive due process because the plenary power
doctrine of Congress over immigration law confined the court to searching for a facially
legitimate and bona fide reason for the restriction and that given the urgency of the war on drugs,
this reason was easy to find). To understand why the Morrobel decision was decided in this
way, it is important to note that the court in this case characterized the plaintiff’s constitutional
argument as substantive, and not procedural. The person had a bail hearing and he had requested
relief which had been denied by the immigration judge. Therefore, the court concluded, what the
plaintiff was really challenging was the substantive validity of the aggravated felony preclusion
and that there was no procedural due process issue and thus no need to determine whether
individualized hearing were constitutionally required. The court, only having to address the
plaintiff’s substantive arguments, was confined to the plenary power doctrine and only needed to
find a facially and bona fide reason for the restriction. Given the urgency of the war on drugs,
this reason was not difficult to find. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (setting
forth the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard utilized by the court in Morrobel);
see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 93-94.
54
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 504(a), 104 Stat. 5049
(former 8 U.S.C. § 1252). See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 94; THOMAS ALEXANDER
ALEINKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 898 (1998); Plight of
the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1920; Stacy J. Borisov, Give Me Liberty or Give Me
Deportation: The Indefinite Detention of Non-Removable, Criminal Aliens, 13 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 183, 191 (2001).
55
See ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 898.
56
Id.
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were lawful were often upheld based on the fact that individualized consideration had been given
to the non-citizen’s release.57
As a result of the amendments to ADAA, the rules mandating the detention of noncitizens appeared to be somewhat unclear. No longer was there any bright-line rule requiring the
release of a detained non-citizen after six months. The new rules governing the detention of both
deportable non-citizens and excludable non-citizens purported to authorize indefinite detention
provided that there was an opportunity for regular review of the detention decision. Even this
rule, however, was not entirely clear. It was not until 1996, with the passing of both
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act58 (AEDPA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act59 (IIRIRA) that Congress abruptly changed its direction and began
to clarify the rules governing the mandatory detention of non-citizens.
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Following the Oklahoma City Bombing, an unrelenting and fiercely resolved Congress
capitalized on the public’s concern with terrorism in passing AEDPA in April of 1996.60
Congress seized this opportunity to come down hard on criminal non-citizens, especially those
who were suspected terrorists.61 This legislation, along with IIRIRA enacted later in the same
year, radically altered the statutory framework which governed the detention of non-citizens.

57

Id. See also Hernandez-Ebank v. Caplinger, 951 F.Supp. 99 (E.D.La. 1996) (finding no
constitutional violation in holding a non-citizen indefinitely because the non-citizen had entered
lawfully and had received a bond hearing).
58
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub L No. 104-132, 110
Stat 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
59
Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L No 104-208,
110 Stat 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
60
See Clark, supra note 4, at 248.
61
While those responsible for the Oklahoma City Bombing were American citizens, Congress
still used this opportunity to come down hard all terrorists, and in particular, non-citizen
terrorists.
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Combined, AEDPA and IIRIRA extended mandatory detention to several other major categories:
(1) almost anyone who was inadmissible or deportable on crime-related grounds (not just
aggravated felons); (2) those who were inadmissible or deportable on terrorism grounds; (3)
most arriving passengers (i.e., those non-citizens who had yet to be admitted into the United
States); and (4) individuals who were awaiting the execution of final removal orders.62 In
addition, under both AEDPA and IIRIRA, judicial review of immigration decisions was severely
restricted.63
AEDPA significantly impacted the rules governing the detention of non-citizens in three
important ways. First, it eliminated the exception provided under the previous law for the
release of those aliens previously admitted lawfully who were determined by the INS to pose no
threat to the community.64 In other words, lawfully admitted convicted aggravated felons were
no longer entitled to an individualized consideration of release and could potentially be detained
indefinitely. Essentially, this marked a return to the unrelenting detention mandate which was
enacted by ADAA in 1988. Second, AEDPA vastly expanded the definition of an aggravated
felon and thus subjected a broader category on non-citizens to mandatory detention during
removal proceedings and thereafter until repatriation.65 Consequently, more aliens were subject

62

See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § §§ 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 255
(b)(2)(A), 236(c)(1)(A,B,C,D), 241(a)(1,2,3), 66 Stat. 163, 177 (1952) (current version at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (2000)).
63
See id. For a full examination of how AEDPA and IIRIRA limited judicial review of
immigration actions see David Cole, No Clear Statement: An Arguments for Preserving Judicial
Review of Removal Decisions, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 427 (1998).
64
See Borisov, supra note 54, at 191-92.
65
See id. at 191; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(43) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43) (2000)) (outlining those crimes which are deemed to be aggravated felonies). While
the list of aggravated felonies is long, some examples include murder, rape, sexual abuse of a
minor, illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, and illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive
devices or in explosive materials. See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(43) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)).
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to deportation based upon their classification as an aggravated felon.66 Finally, in addition to
expanding the definition of aggravated felony, AEDPA made nearly all deportable aliens with a
criminal record ineligible for a relief provision that had previously allowed seven-year lawful
permitted residents who committed crimes to seek discretionary relief from deportation from an
immigration judge by showing rehabilitation, family or community ties, and other favorable
factors.67 In sum, because AEDPA eliminated the exception under previous law which allowed
the INS to release those non-citizens previously lawfully admitted if they were deemed to pose
no danger to the community or risk of flight, the INS lost its discretion to release most criminal
non-citizens, irrespective of their removal prospects.68
Many of the changes under AEDPA did not remain in effect for long. IIRIRA, passed
only a few months after AEDPA, was responsible for amending the INA and subjecting a
broader category of non-citizens to mandatory detention during removal proceedings and
thereafter until repatriation.69 Essentially, under IIRIRA, if a non-citizen had been convicted of
an aggravated felony, upon completion of his prison sentence, he could then be placed into the
custody of the INS through an order of the Attorney General.70 The Attorney General then had
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Since the introduction of the concept of an “aggravated felony” in 1988 with the passing of
ADAA, the definition has been vastly expanded. See Martin, supra note 43, at 63. IIRIRA,
passed shortly thereafter AEDPA, expanded the concept of aggravated felony to an even wider
range of offenses, by lowering certain thresholds that had to be exceeded before several of most
widely applicable parts of the definition would apply. For a more in-depth discussion of the
changes the AEDPA and IIRIRA made to the definition of an aggravated felony see LEGOMSKY,
supra note 41, at 540-556; see also id.
67
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(c) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (2000)). See also
Martin, supra note 43, at 63.
68
See Borisov, supra note 54, at 192.
69
See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241(a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2000))
(“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”). See also Plight of
the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1921.
70
See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241(a)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(2) (2000)) (an
alien who “is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable”).
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the authority to determine whether the non-citizen should be released into the United States or
removed.71
3. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
IIRIRA made three significant changes to the prior sections of the INA that pertained to
the indefinite detention of non-citizens. First, IIRIRA redefined the long -standing distinctions
between excludable and deportable non-citizens.72 As discussed above, prior to the passing of
IIRIRA, non-citizens who were stopped at the port of entry and detained at that point were
deemed excludable, even if they were eventually granted conditional parole into the United
States.73 Alternatively, non-citizens who had gained entry into the United States, either legally
or illegally were considered deportable.74 This distinction was extremely important because
traditionally courts had ruled that the Constitution afforded greater rights to non-citizens already
in the United States than to those who had only just arrived at the border.75 IIRIRA, however,
abolished the significant legal distinction between excludable and deportable non-citizens by
labeling excludable non-citizens and non-citizens who had illegally entered the country
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See id. § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2000)).
See Montague, supra note 42, at 1443.
73
See id. See also Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, n.4 (3d Cir. 1999).
74
See id.
75
See Martin, supra note 43, at 52 (discussing the exclusion-deportation line and its impact on
non-citizens); see also Chae Chan Ping v. Untied States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that the
power to exclude foreigners is an incident of sovereignty in turning away a Chinese immigrant at
the border who had previously lived in the United States); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651
(1892) (excluding a Japanese immigrant whose husband already lived in the United States at the
point of entry); United States ex. rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (preventing the
wife of a United States citizen from entering the country without the opportunity for a hearing
and holding “whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned.”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) (refusing to allow back into the United States an individual who had previously lived in
the United States for many years without incident).
72
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inadmissible.76 These non-citizens, along with non-citizens who had legally entered the United
States, were now subject to uniform removal proceedings.77 Hence, the bright-line which once
existed between those stopped at the border and those apprehended within the United States
became blurred. Second, IIRIRA expanded the offenses for which non-citizens could be
removed.78 Any crime that carried more than a one-year prison sentence, irrespective of how
much time was served, or any crime that involved drugs or a firearm, now resulted in removal.79
Finally, and most significantly for the plight of non-citizens detained on grounds of
suspected terrorism, IIRIRA eased the detention mandate under AEDPA and restored some
release discretion to the INS.80 IIRIRA enacted a new section of the INA, § 241(a), that
comprehensively governed post-order detention, irrespective of the ground of deportability or
excludability and regardless of the non-citizens criminal record.81 It mandated the detention of
all removable aliens for a ninety-day “removal period” beginning when the order became final,
and it directed the INS to ensure their departure within that time.82 It then provided for
supervised release if removal had not been achieved during that period.83 The law not only
required the mandatory detention of deportable non-citizens for a period of ninety days while the
INS made travel arrangements to return, it provided that criminal non-citizens could be detained
beyond the removal period. (Criminal non-citizens included those removable on terrorist
76

See Montague, supra note 42, at 1443.
See id.
78
See id. at 1444.
79
See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 237 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2) (2000)); see also
id.
80
See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000)); see
also Montague, supra note 42, at 1444.
81
See Immigration and Nationality Act, § 241 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2000)); see
also Martin, supra note 43, at 66.
82
See Martin, supra note 43, at 66.
77

22

grounds, as well as those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, drugrelated offenses, firearms offenses, and a catchall category of “miscellaneous crimes,” or those
non-citizens who were determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or
unlikely to comply with the order of removal.).84 The federal government allowed exceptions in
limited circumstances, permitting the release of aliens who were enrolled in witness protection
programs and who did not pose flight or security risks.85
Therefore, while detention after the ninety-day removal period was not mandated for
anyone, it was now explicitly permissible for specified categories of non-citizens. Furthermore,
now a single unified post-removal order detention regime covered both those non-citizens
stopped at the border as well resident non-citizens who may have lived their entire lives in the
United States. These changes, coupled with the increasingly broad range of crimes for which
non-citizens could now be deported, significantly expanded the number of non-citizens subject to
indefinite detention.86 Consequently, challenges to the lengthy and potential indefinite detention

83

See id; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, § 236 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
(2000)).
84
See id. Recent court decisions have invalidated the no-bail provision of the INA as it applies
to lawful permanent residents. See Hoang v. Comfort, 2002 WL 339348, at *11 (10th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that "the government has failed to show special justifications for the mandatory
detention provision contained in INA §236(c) which are sufficient to outweigh a lawful
permanent resident alien's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint
without an individualized determination of flight risk or danger to the public"); Kim v. Ziglar,
276 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "the government has not provided a 'special
justification' for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a lawful permanent resident alien's
liberty interest in an individualized determination of flight risk and dangerousness").
85
ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 54, at 883.
86
See Martin, supra note 43, at 67 (discussing the broad range of non-citizens subject to
mandatory detention under IIRIRA). When enacting IIRIRA, Congress did not provide specific
guidance as to when the INS should detain inadmissible or criminal non-citizens beyond the
ninety-day “removal period.” Therefore, under the guidance of the Attorney General the INS
introduced implementing regulations which provided that a non-removable non-citizen could be
released from custody if the non-citizen demonstrated that their release would not pose a danger
to the community or to the safety of other persons or to property or present a significant risk of
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of non-citizens under § 241(a) made their way to the courts. In fact, by 2001 the INA’s postorder detention provision had led to the indefinite detention of some 3,400 deportable noncitizens whose home countries refused to accept them.87 Because of both the increasing number
of suits filed by detained non-citizens and the subsequent split between the federal circuit courts
across the country regarding the constitutionality of indefinite detention under § 241(a)(6), in
October 2000, the United States Supreme Court agreed to take up the issue in order to resolve
questions surrounding the use of indefinite detention.88
The decision of the Court in Zadvydas v. Davis89 altered the landscape of non-citizen
detention law by raising fundamental questions regarding the scope of Congress’s power to
authorize the confinement of non-citizens, the latitude available to the executive branch in
enforcing such legislation, and the level of judicial deference that should be afforded the
judgment of the political branches on immigration matters, particularly where national security
interests are at stake.90 Decided less than four months before the terrorist attacks, the Court’s
ruling and interpretation of INA § 241(a)(6) in Zadvydas represented the law as it existed in
regards to the detention of non-citizen suspected terrorists as of September 11, 2001.91

flight. The regulations allowed the continued detention of any alien unable to meet that burden.
An initial custody determinations, consisting of a review of the alien’s records and any written
information submitted on their behalf, was to be conducted prior to the expiration of the ninetyday removal period in order to determine if such a burden could be met. Under further
procedures, if the non-citizen’s deportation was not effectuated and no release was granted by
the end of the ninety-day period, a subsequent review was mandated “at the expiration of the
three-month period after the ninety-day review or as soon thereafter as practicable.” If detention
was continued, subsequent reviews were to be held at least once a year. See Borisov, supra note
54, at 192-93.
87
Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1921.
88
See id. at 1923.
89
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
90
See Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1915-16.
91
The decision of the Supreme Court in Zadvydas will be discussed in detail in Part IV of this
Comment.
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B. The Mandatory Detention of Non-Citizen Terrorists in the United Kingdom prior to
September 11, 2001
The United Kingdom has been dealing with terrorism and the detention of individuals
deemed to pose a threat to its nation long before the United States even came into existence.92
While some of their experiences with terrorism resulted from its withdrawal from their colonial
empire, since 1968 the principal terrorist threat which has shaped the United Kingdom’s
response to terrorism has been connected with the questions surrounding whether Northern
Ireland should remain part of the United Kingdom or rather it should join the Republic of
Ireland.93 Thus, this Part will focus primarily on the legislation pertaining to the detention of
non-citizen suspected terrorists enacted by the United Kingdom from 1968 until September 11,
2001. In order to better understand the distinct situation of Northern Ireland which defines the
United Kingdom’s approach towards terrorism and which has molded its response to terrorism in
the past, however, it is first necessary to briefly examine both the historical development of the
problems of Northern Ireland as well as the United Kingdom’s legislative responses to these
troubles. This will provide a framework for how and why the United Kingdom has reached its
current legislative position.
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See Bonner, supra note 31, at 172. In addition, while beyond the purview of this Comment, it
is important to realize that the problems associated with Ireland and Northern Ireland did not
begin with the partition of the island by the British Government in 1920. Celtic tribes originally
settled Ireland and were converted to Catholicism by Saint Patrick around 450 A.D. Since that
time, the majority of Irish have followed the Church in Rome. With the beginning of British
presence in Ireland in 1169 and finally with King Henry II’s capture of Dublin in 1171, however,
there has been strife between the Catholics and Protestants in Ireland and more specifically in
Northern Ireland. See Clark, supra note 4, at 249-52. For a complete Irish history and the
assumption and exercise of extraordinary State power by the British government in Ireland, see
generally DONAHUE, supra note 6 (discussing counter-terrorism law and emergency powers in
the United Kingdom from 1922-2000).
93
See Bonner, supra note 31, at 172-73.
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1. The Division of Ireland and Early British Anti-Terrorism Efforts
In 1920, with the Government of Ireland Act, Britain formally divided Ireland,
establishing separate, subordinate parliaments in Belfast and Dublin.94 Despite a short civil war
spurred by the Irish Free State’s opposition to the island’s partition, the Republic of Ireland was
finally recognized in 1949 with the Republic of Ireland Act.95 Nevertheless, the establishment of
an independent Ireland did not erase years of resentment and discord. Many Irish citizens,
throughout the country, were not satisfied with a freedom that did not encompass all of Ireland.96
Consequently, during the late 1960s, civil unrest steadily increased in Northern Ireland.97 The
government set up by the British in Northern Ireland, known better as Stormont, reacted with
hostility, either ignoring or rejecting outright the demands of the protestors.98 While the protests
for reform were initially non-violent, seeing that its attempts to improve the conditions of the
minority community in Northern Ireland through political and legal action had largely failed, the
Irish citizens who were vehemently opposed to the idea of a divided Ireland quickly abandoned
the tenets of non-violence.99 Soon thereafter, the British military, at Stormont’s request, came to
Northern Ireland in 1969 to assist in patrolling the streets and essentially replaced the Royal
Ulster Constabulary (RUC)100 as the force primarily responsible for maintaining law and order in
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Clark, supra note 4, at 252.
Id.
96
See id.
97
See id. at 252-53; see also DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 117.
98
See Clark, supra note 4, at 253; see also Oren Gross, “Once More unto the Breach”: The
Systematic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched
Emergencies, 23 YALE. J. INT’L LAW 437, 475 (1998).
99
See id.
100
The RUC is the British-backed, Protestant-run police force in Northern Ireland. See Roger
Meyers, A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping
Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 16 (1990)
(discussing the role of the RUC in Northern Ireland).
95
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the territory.101 The situation culminated in 1972 with the infamous “Bloody Sunday” massacre
which left thirteen unarmed protesters dead at the hands of the British military.102 The chaos
which followed gave new life to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) which had remained quiet
since the creation of the Free Irish State and resulted in the indefinite suspension of the Stormont
government by Britain.103 It was at this time that the British began direct rule of Northern
Ireland.104
In 1973, following the bloodiest year of the “troubles” between Northern Ireland and
Great Britain, the British Parliament enacted the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
1973 (EPA 1973) which repealed the Special Powers Act which had been in place since the
partition of Ireland in the 1920s.105 Many of the repealed statute’s provisions were retained in
the new legislation.106 In addition, EPA 1973 established the Diplock courts, in which the trial
of persons suspected of certain offenses was to be conducted by one judge, operating under
relaxed rules of evidence and sitting without a jury.107
Another layer of emergency legislation applying to Northern Ireland was introduced in
1974 with the enactment of the first Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA
1974).108 In contrast to EPA 1973, PTA 1974’s sphere of applicability was not limited to
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See id.
See id.
103
See id.
104
See id.
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See Gross, supra note 98, at 276. See generally KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., LAW AND STATE: THE
CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1975) (discussing the history of British anti-terrorism legislation
and how its effect on Northern Ireland).
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See Gross, supra note 98, at 476.
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See id. See also Bonner, supra note 31, at 183; Clark, supra note 4, at 256; DONAHUE, supra
note 6, at 123-27. See generally JOHN D. JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY:
DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1995) (providing an overview of how the Diplock
court system operate).
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See Gross, supra note 98, at 476.
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Northern Ireland but instead encompassed all of the United Kingdom.109 PTA 1974 essentially
replaced the previous legislation, Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act, which
was passed by Parliament in 1939 in an effort to deal with an attempt by the IRA to extend their
terrorist campaign to the United Kingdom.110 After the passing of the 1939 Act, however,
because the IRA lacked a sympathetic community from which to operate and because of the
severe measures imposed by the British government, its activities diminished.111 Therefore,
similar to the 1939 legislation, PTA 1974 was introduced at a time where there was widespread
public outrage and demands for greater police action against the IRA.112 The broad regulatory
power of PTA 1974 included the key anti-terrorism provisions which have consistently marked
Britain’s response to the unrest in Northern Ireland since the early 1970’s.113
The introduction of PTA 1974 created a dual system of criminal justice in the United
Kingdom.114 Ordinary decent criminals suspected of the pettiest to the most horrific offenses
were treated under the ordinary criminal law while those suspected of terrorism were now dealt
with under PTA 1974.115 The British government originally intended these “emergency powers”
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See id; see also Clark, supra note 4, at 253-54.
See Gross, supra note 98, at 476; DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 35-36; HILLYARD, supra note 6,
at 1-2.
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See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 35-36.
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See HILLYARD, supra note 6, at 1.
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See Gross, supra note 98, at 476; see also Bonner, supra note 31, at 179. Prior to the passing
of PTA 1974 and EPA 1973 the regulations which governed the detention of suspected terrorists
were found under the 1922-43 Special Powers Acts (SPA). Although the government
immediately announced its intent to repeal the 1922-43 SPA and Regulations and to replace them
with new emergency legislation, the resultant 1973 EPA and 1974 PTA did not so much revoke
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EPA 1973 sphere of applicability was limited to Northern Ireland, PTA was generally applicable
throughout the United Kingdom. See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 130.
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laws that were only applicable to suspected terrorist to last for the brief period it took to
reestablish order in Northern Ireland.116 That brief period, however, never expired.
PTA 1974 was based on two different sources, which, in one way or the other, had been
introduced to deal with Irish political violence.117 It drew upon and expanded upon a number of
key elements of EPA 1973, particularly the powers of arrest, detention, and proscription and the
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, which had been introduced to deal
with a previous campaign of the IRA.118 PTA 1974 provided the police with extended and
expansive powers of arrest and detention and gave them new powers to control the movement of
persons entering and leaving Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This new legislation swiftly
became subsumed in British legislation.119 Soon after this new legislation was enacted, the
burden shifted from those supporting emergency measures to prove that they were imperative, to
individuals seeking to repeal the legislation needing to demonstrate that an emergency no longer
existed.120 In other words, the purported temporary nature of the emergency measures seemed to
be long forgotten as emergency measures slowly became the rule rather than the exception in
Northern Ireland. While there were various reviews and minor amendments to both EPA 1973
and PTA 1974 between 1974 and 2000, these amendments were largely centered on cosmetic
alterations to the existing statutes, leaving the vast majority of the provisions included in the
amended versions of EPA and PTA still intact.121 Few new powers were introduced and even
fewer existing powers were relinquished. Over this period of time, a blending of EPA and PTA
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and a more detailed consideration of permanent counter-terrorist law emerged.122 The gradual
merger of these provisions ultimately resulted in the passing of Terrorism Act 2000 in March
2001. Before discussing Terrorism Act 2000 and the law as it pertained to the United Kingdom
as of September 11, 2001, however, in an effort to better understand the changes that Terrorism
Act 2000 made, it is first essential to provide a brief history of the arrest and detention provisions
as they existed prior to the passing of this piece of legislation.
2. Anti-Terrorism Law in the United Kingdom from 1973-2000
The “emergency powers” laws initiated with the passing of PTA 1974 and EPA 1973
granted extremely broad discretion to both the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British
military in investigations of suspected terrorist activity in Northern Ireland.123 PTA 1974
authorized law enforcement to arrest anyone without a warrant where it had reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the arrested individual was guilty of some offense under the legislation or if
the individual was or had been concerned in the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts
of terrorism in connection with Northern Ireland affairs or international terrorism.124 Police
therefore were permitted to stop an individual on the street and question him regarding his
identity and recent movements.125 The provisions also permitted the RUC or the British military
to search an individual’s premises and seize any possessions based upon the low threshold
“reasonable suspicion” of terrorist activity.126 Furthermore, anything found during a warrantless
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search could be confiscated if the law enforcement believed the item was somehow connected to
a crime.127
In addition, PTA 1974 authorized the arrest and detention of suspects for questioning
without trial.128 The RUC was authorized to arrest and detain an individual for an initial period
of forty-eight hours, which would then be extended to an additional five-day period upon the
authorization of Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State, all without formal charges or an
appearance before a magistrate.129 The total length of detention could not, however, exceed
seven days.130 Because the prime objective of all the PTAs had never been the pursuit of a
prosecution but instead the pursuit of intelligence gathering in an effort to defeat terrorism, the
RUC usually ended up releasing a majority of those they detained without ever charging them.131
A review procedure for the detention of suspected terrorists was introduced in an
amendment to PTA in 1989. This procedure required an initial review to be carried out as soon
as practicable after the beginning of the detention and that subsequent reviews would be carried
out at twelve-hour intervals.132 The reviews, however, could be postponed if it was not
practicable to carry them out because the person was being questioned or if no review officer
was readily available.133 The detention could be continued only if it was necessary to obtain or
preserve evidence specifically related to the offences under the Act or if the individual was
127
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thought to be involved in terrorist activities.134 What was so striking about this review procedure
is that under the amended PTA, a person could be held for up to seven days without any outside
assessment.135 The detainee only had a right to make representations to the review officer.136
Finally, prior to the 1989 amendment there were no rules governing how long a person
detained under PTA could be held without being permitted to contact a friend or lawyer. After
1989, however, suspected terrorists were permitted to request to have one person informed of
their detention situation as soon as practicable.137 Nevertheless, this concession was often
delayed if there were reasonable grounds for believing that alerting someone as to an individual’s
detention would interfere with the gathering of information about the commission, preparation or
instigation of acts of terrorism or because it would make it more difficult to prevent an act of
terrorism or to secure the conviction of someone involved.138
3. Terrorism Act 2000
The purported “temporary” legislation of PTA and EPA was replaced with Terrorism Act
2000. This piece of legislation reformed and extended the aforementioned counter-terrorist
legislation, and put it largely on a permanent basis.139 Terrorism Act 2000 came into effect in
early 2001 and applied to non-citizen terrorist groups as well as domestic terrorist groups and
was the sole responsibility of the Home Secretary. Therefore, as discussed earlier in this Part,
Terrorism Act 2000, unlike other anti-terrorism measures like PTA and EPA did not require
annual Parliamentary review.

Specifically, the Act (1) prohibited fund-raising and other kinds
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of financial support for terrorism, together with power for a court to order forfeiture of any
money or other property connected with the offenses; (2) provided the police with powers to
arrest and detain suspected terrorists, and broader powers to stop and search vehicles and
pedestrians, and to impose parking restrictions; (3) provided examination powers at ports and
borders; (4) provided for the treatment of suspects who are detained and for judicial extension of
the initial period of detention; (5) proscribed weapons training for terrorist purposes, including
recruitment for such training; and (6) proscribed the directing of a terrorist organization,
possessing articles for terrorist purposes, possessing information for terrorist purposes, and
incitement of overseas terrorism.140 Terrorism Act 2000 was presciently enacted by the United
Kingdom in an effort to both expand its power to combat terrorism ahead of the September 11,
2001 attacks as well as to provide some permanency to the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism
law.
In addition, Terrorism Act 2000 repealed previous anti-terrorism measures and adopted a
wider definition of terrorism, recognizing that terrorism may have religious or ideological as well
as political motivation, and covered actions which might not be violent in themselves but which
can, in a modern society, have a devastating impact.141 These could include interfering with the
supply of water or power where life, health or safety may be put at risk, and the disrupting of key
computer systems.142
Terrorism Act 2000 was less than a year old when the attacks of September 11, 2001
occurred. Therefore, the full effects of the Act’s detention provisions were never fully realized
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and instead have been amended and expanded on by Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001 as will be examined closely in Part III of this Comment.
III. DETENTION UNDER THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING
APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 AND THE
ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001
Just six weeks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Patriot
Act—a sweeping anti-terrorism bill which, among other things, broadened the definition of
“terrorist” and gave law enforcement officials expansive new powers to detain and prosecute
accused terrorists.143 A number of the Patriot Act’s provisions are uncontroversial and in fact
were welcomed by the public during a time they felt most vulnerable to international
terrorism.144 The Act, nevertheless, stands out as radical in the degree in which it sacrifices
political freedoms in the name of national security and consolidates new powers in the executive
branch.145 The particular provisions at the center of this Comment, §§ 411 and 412,146 which
when acting together have been widely criticized as depriving non-citizens of their due process
and First Amendment rights, mandate the detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism.147
Section 411 greatly expands the class of non-citizens who are subject to deportation on grounds
143
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of terrorism through its expanded definitions of the terms “terrorist activity,” “engage in terrorist
activity,” and “terrorist organization.”148 Section 412 substantially enlarges the authority of the
Attorney General to place non-citizens he suspects are engaged in terrorist activities in detention
while their deportation proceedings are pending.149
ATCSA is the United Kingdom’s counterpart to the Patriot Act. Passed in December
2001 in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, ATCSA increases the
British government’s power to prevent non-citizen suspected terrorists from abusing the
immigration laws of the United Kingdom. Like the Patriot Act, ATCSA has been widely
criticized because it is comprised of unusually coercive powers.150 In contrast to the Patriot Act,
however, ATCSA was not passed in response to any widely-perceived public emergency in the
United Kingdom. The attacks of September 11 were isolated events perpetrated against the
United States. There have been no attacks against the United Kingdom and in fact, the attacks of
September 11 did not deliberately target Britons.151 Furthermore, as will be discussed below,
ATCSA takes the detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism a step further than authorized
by the Patriot Act. While most of the Act was accepted without much argument, a small number
of provisions provoked enormous controversy. Prior to the enactment of the provisions under
147
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Part 4 of ATCSA the United Kingdom basically had three options for dealing with suspected
non-citizen terrorists: (1) deport them to a safe third country; (2) prosecute them under existing
United Kingdom law; or (3) let them go free.152 Section 23 of ATCSA gives the government yet
another option, potential indefinite detention to prevent the suspected non-citizen terrorist from
engaging in any future terrorist activities which may be detrimental to the United Kingdom.153
The most controversial provisions of the act, contained in Part 4,154 will be outlined here.
Part 4, and more specifically, §§ 21-33 of ATCSA, lays out the powers of the Secretary of State
to certify people as “suspected international terrorists” and “national security risks” and for their
consequent detention without charge or trial for an unspecified and potentially unlimited period
of time.
As Part II of this Comment explained, September 11, 2001 did not mark the introduction
of terrorism to the governments and people of the United States and the United Kingdom. Each
country had previously encountered acts of terrorism and had responded to terrorism and terrorist
threats through various pieces of legislation, albeit differently. The September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks were different, though. The precise planning and hatred that characterized the attacks
and the overall destruction left in their wake was unlike anything either nation had seen before.
This Part will examine and compare the legislative responses of both nations to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. More specifically, this Part will focus on and outline the specific
measures of each of these pieces of legislation which allow for the potential indefinite detention
of non-citizens. Through this comparison it becomes apparent how restrained the United States’
151
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legal response to the terrorist acts of September 11 appears. Finally, this Part will analyze the
outlined detention provisions and discuss the potential problems which are almost certain to arise
in enforcing both of these pieces of legislation.
A. Expanding the Definition of Terrorism
1. Section 411 of the Patriot Act
Section 411 of the Patriot Act imposes guilt by association on non-citizens by vastly
expanding the class of non-citizens that can be removed on terrorist grounds. Before September
11, the term “terrorist activity” was commonly understood to be limited to premeditated and
politically-motivatedviolence targeted against a civilian population.

155

Section 411, however,

stretches that term to encompass any crime that involves the use of “a weapon or dangerous
device (other than for mere personal monetary gain).”156 Under this expansive definition, a noncitizen who grabs a knife or a provisional weapon in any type of heat-of the-moment altercation
may be deemed removable as a “terrorist.”157
In addition, the term “engage in terrorist activity” has also been expanded to include
soliciting funds for, soliciting membership for, and providing material support to a “terrorist
organization” even when that organization has legitimate political and humanitarian ends and the
non-citizen seeks only to support these lawful ends.158 Before September 11, non-citizens were
deportable for engaging in or supporting terrorist activity, but not for mere association. Noncitizens could be deported for providing material support to an organization only if they knew or
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reasonably should have known that their activity would support the organization “in conducting
a terrorist activity.”159 Section 411 of the Patriot Act, however, eliminates that nexus
requirement. It makes non-citizens deportable for wholly innocent associational activity with a
“terrorist organization,” whether or not there is any connection between the non-citizen’s
associational conduct and any act of violence, much less terrorism.160
Furthermore, the definition of the term “terrorist organization” has been expanded to
include groups that have never before been designated as terrorist if they are composed of “two
or more individuals, whether organized or not,” who engage in specified terrorist activities.161
Therefore, under this law, in a situation in which a non-citizen has solicited funds for, solicited
membership for, or provided material support to an undesignated “terrorist organization,” § 411
imposes on him the difficult burden of “demonstrat[ing] that he did not know, and should not
159
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reasonably have known, that the act would further the organizations terrorist activity.”162 For
example, if an unsuspecting non-citizen donates money to a charity that is held to be a terrorist
organization, the seemingly innocent act of giving by the non-citizen may very well serve as a
ground for removal.163
While the First Amendment implications of § 411 of the Patriot Act are beyond the scope
of this Comment, it should be noted that by redefining the definitions of terrorist activity and
terrorist organization, the Patriot Act also resurrects the notion of an ideological exclusion—the
act of denying entry to non-citizens for pure speech.164 Section 411 bars admission to noncitizens who “endorse or espouse terrorist activity,” or who “persuade others to support terrorist
activity a terrorist organization,” in ways determined by the Secretary of State to undermine U.S.
efforts to combat terrorism.165 It also excludes non-citizens who are representatives of groups
that “endorse acts of terrorist activity” in ways that similarly undermine U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism.166 It is well-established that citizens have a constitutional right to endorse terrorist
organizations or terrorist activity, so long as their speech is not intended and likely to produce
imminent lawless action.167 While the Supreme Court has ruled that non-citizens that have yet to
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procure entry into the United States have limited constitutional rights,168 these ideological
exclusions nevertheless raise constitutional concerns. The First Amendment is designed to
protect free public debate and in keeping out those persons who voice unpopular beliefs, the
opportunity of US citizens to hear and consider those ideas may be diminished.169 Excluding
people for their ideas stands in stark contrast to the spirit of political freedom for which the
United States stands and for which we are deeply resolved to protecting for in response to the
September 11 attacks.170
2. Terrorist Status under ATCSA
The core of ATCSA is contained in Part 4 which addresses immigration and asylum. Part
4 allows suspected international terrorists to be deported from or imprisoned in the United
Kingdom.171 The Secretary of State may certify that anyone is a suspected international terrorist
if he reasonably believes that the person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national
security and that the person is a terrorist.172 This is analogous to the power of the Attorney
General under the Patriot Act to certify a non-citizen as a terrorist.173 In contrast to the limits
placed on Attorney General’s power under the Patriot Act in regards to the amount of time he
has to commence proceedings against the detained non-citizen, however, there is no such
limitation placed on the Secretary of State in Britain. As discussed above, under § 412 of the
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Patriot Act, the Attorney General is required to place a detained non-citizen either in removal
proceedings or charge him with a criminal offense within seven days after the commencement of
detention. If the preceding requirement is not satisfied, the Attorney General must release the
non-citizen. Under ATCSA, however, there is no similar limitation placed on the Secretary of
State to detain an individual. Thus, prior to even certification, a non-citizen could potentially be
detained for an indefinite amount of time.
Under ATCSA, the all-important word “terrorist” is defined as a person who (a) is or has
been concerned in the commission, preparation, or instigation or acts of international terrorism;
(b) is a member or belongs to an international terrorist group; or (c) has links with an
international terrorist group provides for the power of certification of a person as a suspected
international terrorist.174 The last of these criteria is potentially extremely broad and vague and
the government came under pressure from Parliament to clarify the phrase “links with.”175 In
response, the government narrowed the scope of the phrase by offering the following definition:
“a person has links with an international terrorist group only if he supports or assists it.”176
Thus, the expanded definition of a terrorist under ATCSA is comparable to that under the Patriot
Act which now makes non-citizens deportable as terrorist for wholly innocent associational
activity with a “terrorist organization,” regardless if there is any connection between the noncitizen’s associational conduct and any act of violence, much less terrorism.177
The term “terrorism” in this section of Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 has
the same meaning as in Terrorism Act 2000, § 1. This definition is broad and includes:
174
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the use or threat of action … designed to influence the government or to intimidate the
public … for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause…which
involves serious violence against a person or serious damage to property, endangers a
person’s life, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or is designed
seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.”178
By seeking to merely influence the government, rather than seeking to intimidate or
coerce the government, and by expanding the definition of terrorism to encompass the most
serious violence, the distinction between terrorism and other criminal activity governed by
regular public order law instead of special provisions of terrorism law, has become blurred.179
Thus, the potential reach of this provision of Part 4 concerning suspected non-citizen terrorists is
considerable. This is important because although granting extraordinary powers to the state
during times of emergency may be justified, the availability of these powers must be limited to
situations where it is absolutely necessary and even then only in carefully defined and specified
circumstances.180 The problem is that the United Kingdom has not satisfied these criteria in
passing the ATCSA.
Compared to the Patriot Act, the definition of terrorism under ATCSA appears to be as
expansive but noticeably less vague. Under the Patriot Act, the term “terrorist activity” has been
stretched to include any crime that involves the use of “a weapon or dangerous device (other than
for mere personal monetary gain).”181 Thus, while the definition under both pieces of legislation
increases the types of activity which will be considered terrorist acts, the definition under
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ATCSA more clearly articulates exactly what type acts will fall under the Act’s definition. Each
definition, however, is open to similar types of abuse.
B. Detention of Certified Individuals
1. Section 412 of the Patriot Act
At the same time that § 411 expands the class of non-citizens who are deportable on
grounds of terrorism, § 412 inflates the Attorney General’s power to detain non-citizens who are
suspected of terrorism and radically revises the rules governing detention of non-citizens. 182
Prior to September 11, 2001, non-citizens in removal proceedings were subject to preventative
detention under essentially the same standards that apply to defendants in criminal proceedings:
They could be detained without bond if they posed a danger to the community or a risk of
flight.183 If the government could not make such a showing in a hearing before an immigration
judge, non-citizens were entitled to release on bond.184
Conversely, § 412 of the Patriot Act authorizes the Attorney General to detain noncitizens without a hearing and without a showing that they pose a threat to national security or a
flight risk.185 He need only certify that he “has reasonable grounds to believe” that a non-citizen
is engaged in terrorist activity or in any other activity endangering the national security of the
United States, and the non-citizen is then subject to potentially indefinite mandatory detention.186
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Following certification by the Attorney General, a non-citizen suspected of terrorist
activity must be taken into custody and may be held without charge of a criminal or immigration
violation for up to seven days.187 To continue detention beyond seven days, the government
must begin deportation proceedings or bring criminal charges against the non-citizen.188 If the
government fails to do so, the non-citizen must be released.189 For a non-citizen against whom
the government initiates deportation proceedings, detention must continue, even if the noncitizen is granted relief from removal, until the Attorney General decertifies him.190 If the
certified non-citizen is deemed removable and his removal is unlikely in the “reasonably
foreseeable future,” he may be detained for an additional period of up to six months if his release
would “threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any
person.”191 If the non-citizen is ultimately determined not to be removable, however, he must be
released.192
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Section 412 also requires the Attorney General to review the detention of non-citizens
certified under the Act every six months and to report to Congress on the number of aliens
certified, their nationality, the grounds for certification, and the duration of detention.193 In
addition, certified individuals who are detained under the Patriot Act do have access to judicial
review.194 Detainees are allowed to initiate habeas corpus proceedings in any district court
otherwise having jurisdiction.195 Appeals from unfavorable decisions, however, are limited and
more difficult to obtain than prior to September 11, 2001. Appeals may be made only to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the law which must be applied in such cases is
limited to the law applied by that court or the United States Supreme Court.196
2. Detention under ATCSA
The most significant power which the state now has under Part 4 of Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001 pertaining to suspected international terrorists is the authority of
the Secretary of State to detain a certified suspected non-citizen terrorist indefinitely without
trial.197 This is easily distinguishable from the Patriot Act which explicitly provides for
proceedings, either removal or criminal, to be commenced against the non-citizen within seven
days of their apprehension as well as provides for judicial review of any decision to certify an
individual as a terrorist. Conversely, under § 23 of ATCSA a suspected non-citizen terrorist may
be detained indefinitely if his removal from the United Kingdom is prevented either by a point of
law or by a practical consideration.198 This last point deserves some further explanation.
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There are two primary reasons why the deportation or removal of a non-British national
from the United Kingdom may prove difficult. First, removal or deportation from the United
Kingdom could be prevented by, for example, the fact that the individual concerned may be a
stateless person or because the United Kingdom authorities are unable to find another country
willing to accept him or her.199 The very fact that the individual has been certified by the
Secretary of State as a suspected terrorist may make finding another country an extremely
frustrating task.200
Second, the United Kingdom government may also be prevented from effecting a
removal or deportation of anyone certified as a suspected terrorist as a result of the United
Kingdom’s obligations under Article 3 of European Commission on Human Rights.201 In Chalal
v. United Kingdom,202 the European Court ruled that the British government’s attempt to deport
an individual who had been detained pending deportation to India on “national security” grounds
was in violation of ECHR.203 Chahal was an Indian Sikh who had entered the United Kingdom
illegally and was detained pending deportation, but feared return to India because of his previous
Sikh separatist activities. The Court, in interpreting the ECHR, found that Article 3 protected
one of the most fundamental values of democratic society in that it prohibits in absolute terms
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct
and that Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible.204
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Adhering to this interpretation, the Court held that the prohibition of torture contained in Article
3 of ECHR was absolute and that allegations of national security risk were immaterial to a
determination of whether a person faced a “real risk” of torture if returned.205
Another extremely important aspect of § 23 of ATCSA is the United Kingdom’s
derogation from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), so as to
ensure that the provisions contained in Part 4 of the new legislation do not violate the United
Kingdom’s obligations under Article 5 of the Convention.206 While Article 5(1)(f) of ECHR
permits the lawful “detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the
country or of a person against who action is being taken with a view to deportation,”207 because
the government intends to detain even those individuals who are not subject to removal
proceedings,208 this Article will not save all detentions which the government proposes under this
provision.209 Therefore, to enable Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to be passed, the
British government was forced to formally derogate under Article 15 of ECHR from Article 5(1)
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of ECHR which relates to the detention of a person where there is an intention to remove or
deport him from the United Kingdom.210
What also clearly distinguishes ATCSA from the Patriot Act is that ATCSA excludes
regular judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decisions and actions under both § 21
(certification of a person as a suspected terrorist) and § 23 (indefinite detention without trial of a
suspected terrorist).211 As previously discussed, under § 412 of the Patriot Act a non-citizen
detained as a certified terrorist has the ability to obtain judicial review of his detention. This
review is available exclusively in habeas corpus proceedings and applies to any non-citizen
subject to detention under the Patriot Act. Conversely, ATCSA provides that such decisions and
actions may only be questioned in legal proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission (SIAC).212
SIAC was established by Parliament in 1997 to entertain certain appeals against
immigration and deportation decisions which have been taken on national security grounds.213
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SIAC enjoys the status of that of a superior court of record—one of the effects of which is that it
is not subject to additional judicial review.214 In a proceeding before SIAC, the appellant has his
legal representatives chosen for them by the government and this person is not responsible to the
appellant.215 Furthermore, proceedings before SIAC may be held in the absence of the appellant
and/or his lawyer and proceedings may occur without the appellant being fully aware of the
reasons for the decisions which have been made in respect of him.216 Therefore, unlike § 412 of
the Patriot Act, there are no explicit provisions under ATCSA providing those arrested and
detained under the Act with the right to bring proceedings to have a court determine quickly the
lawfulness of the detention, and order release if the detention is deemed unlawful. The
fundamental safeguard of habeas corpus present in the Patriot Act therefore does not protect noncitizens suspected of terrorism against arbitrary detention under ATCSA.
Operating within the procedural constraints of SIAC, limited review of §§ 21-23 is,
however, available under ATCSA.217 Nevertheless, as discussed above, unlike the Patriot Act,
there is no explicit provision of ATCSA which requires the Secretary of State to commence
proceedings within a certain period of time. A non-citizen could therefore be held for a
considerable amount of time without being charged with any type of immigration violation or
criminal activity. Thus, while SIAC is permitted to hear appeals against certification decisions
under § 21,218 a non-citizen could be held for a long period before even being certified. The
rules governing appeals to SIAC require that all appeals be brought within three months of the
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certification and SIAC is required to cancel a certification if it considers that there are no
reasonable grounds for suspecting the person to be a terrorist.219 With no limit on how long a
non-citizen can be held without being certified as a terrorist, however, an individual could be
detained arbitrarily without a chance for judicial review for a period longer than three months.
SIAC is also required to conduct a review of every certificate issued under § 21 once the
suspected terrorist has been in detention for six months.220 Cancellation of a certification by
SIAC, however, “shall not prevent the Secretary of State from issuing another certificate.”221
Thus, SIAC appears to have little authority to overrule a decision of the Secretary of State to
certify a non-citizen as a terrorist.
Despite the overall extraordinary power of detention without trial which is placed into the
hands of the state, there are two safeguards contained within Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001 which purport to protect against arbitrary detention by the government. First, § 28
requires there to be a review by a person to be appointed by the Secretary of State of the
operation of §§ 21-23.222 This review must be conducted within fourteen months of the Act’s
coming into force.223 This review is somewhat similar to the requirement under § 412 of the
Patriot Act which requires the Attorney General to submit reports to various government
committees on the number of non-citizens who are being affected by the Act’s detention
provisions. Second, § 29 requires that §§ 21-23 will expire within fifteen months after the Act’s
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coming into force, although the Secretary of State retains the power to revive them.224
Furthermore, § 29(7) provides that §§ 21-23 will cease to have effect altogether five years after
the Act’s coming into force and in order to revive these provisions a further Act of Parliament
would be required.225
C. Criticism of the Patriot Act and ATCSA’s Detention Measures
1. Patriot Act
While Congress’s incorporation of judicial review and time limitations into the detention
provisions of the Patriot Act purport to eliminate the potential for indefinite mandatory detention,
it has been alleged that these safeguards may not go far enough.226 Even with the limits placed
on the executive branch’s authority to implement immigration policy, the detention provisions
contained in the Patriot Act undoubtedly raise serious constitutional concerns.
First, and most notably, the detention provisions have been argued to violate a noncitizen’s due process rights.227 By giving the Attorney General the authority to detain a noncitizen based upon a reasonable suspicion of “terrorist activity” broadly conceived, the language
of the statute appears impermissibly vague.228 Though decided before the Patriot Act was
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enacted, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Morales,229 best
illustrates this recognized concept of impermissible vagueness and sets forth the analysis the
Supreme Court would likely employ when interpreting a statute such as the Patriot Act. In City
of Chicago the Court held Chicago’s gang loitering ordinance unconstitutional because it defined
the offense so vaguely as to provide “absolute discretion to police officers to decide what
activities constitute loitering.”230 The Court recognized that “preservation of liberty depends in
part on the maintenance of social order,”231 but ruled that the law violated due process because it
failed to “provide the kind of notice that would enable people to understand what conduct it
prohibits.”232
Applying the analysis of the Supreme Court in City of Chicago, it is possible that the
expansion of the term “terrorist activity” to include the use of “firearm, or other weapon or
dangerous device” under the Patriot Act may be impermissibly vague.233 For instance, this
definition seems to be applicable to any situation from the use of a chemical bomb in a busy New
York City subway station to a bar room fight where one individual threatens another with a
broken beer bottle. Furthermore, the statute’s vague description of “terrorist organizations”
leaves non-citizens constantly pondering whether they are participating in or donating to groups
that engage in “terrorist activity” which would in turn lead to their certification as a terrorist.234
For example, a non-citizen’s good faith donation to a charitable association or a mere innocent
association with a particular organization may consequently result in their deportation. This is
because the Patriot Act includes as “terrorist organizations” any group with “two or more
229
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individuals, whether organized or not,” provided the group engages in specified activities.235 To
more adequately protect the due process rights of non-citizens, a more precise definition may be
necessary to define exactly what conduct will result in detention under the statute.236
Yet another possible due process concern raised by the Patriot Act is that it allows the
indefinite detention of non-citizens who have been granted relief from removal and of noncitizens for who repatriation is not reasonably foreseeable (provided their release would
“threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any
person”).237 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that indefinite civil detention violates
due process unless it is ordered in “non-punitive circumstances” in which a “special
justification” exists.238 The Zadvydas Court did however recognize in dictum that suspected
terrorists could be held for indefinite periods in preventative detention.239 The Court appeared to
understand that removable non-citizens detained for “terrorism or other special circumstances
where special arguments might be made for forms of preventative detention” should not be
affected by the general rule disapproving the indefinite detention of non-citizens not likely to be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.240 Thus, as will be further argued in Part IV of
this Comment, Zadvydas seemingly exempted suspected terrorists as a “small segment of
particularly dangerous individuals” that the government may in fact subject to indefinite
detention.241
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One could also attack the Patriot Act on procedural due process grounds.242 The statute
does not require an objective showing that the individual poses a danger to the community and
instead relies on the Attorney General’s determination that he has “reasonable grounds” to
believe that a non-citizen is engaged in terrorist activity and therefore subject to certification.243
In addition to the above due process attacks which arguably could be made against the
Patriot Act’s detention provisions, the Act has been criticized on other grounds as well. First, it
has been argued that the detention provisions of the Patriot Act provide the certified terrorist
with limited options for relief. The statute prohibits administrative appeal of the Attorney
General’s decision to certify a non-citizen as a terrorist.244 Detainees are therefore left with one
avenue for relief—the filing a habeas petition in federal court.245 This purported safeguard has
been criticized, however, on the grounds that the statue does not establish a standard of review
that will apply to the Attorney General’s certification and the decision to certify the alien in the
first place may rest on secret evidence that cannot be reviewed by the detainee.246 Nevertheless,
as well be discussed below, this avenue of relief available, irrespective of the limits placed upon
242
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it, is substantially greater than the relief available to those non-citizens detained in the United
Kingdom under Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
Finally, as briefly touched upon in Part III.A.1 of this Comment, the Patriot Act may
infringe on a non-citizen’s freedom of expression. By expanding the definition of the term
“terrorist activity” to include the donation to or solicitation of funds for a “terrorist
organization,” the provisions allow for potentially indefinite detention of non-citizens based
solely on political associations which seemingly are under the purview of the First Amendment.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio247, the Supreme Court held that the “constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.”248 Furthermore, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co.249, the Court went even further and ruled that “mere advocacy of the use of force or violence
does not remove speech from the protection of the First Amendment.”250 Nevertheless, the
holdings of the Court in these two cases are not likely to have an impact when attacking the
constitutionality of the detention provisions of the Patriot Act. The reason is that the detention
provisions of the Patriot Act pertain to non-citizens. Although permanent resident non-citizens
do enjoy First Amendment rights,251 under certain circumstances it is well-established that they
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may enjoy less constitutional protection than citizens.252 A strong argument can be made that
any association with a terrorist organization like al-Qaida is both directed at inciting imminent
lawless action and is very likely to incite or produce exactly this type of action.
In sum, the implications of §§ 411 and 412 of the Patriot Act for non-citizens are
certainly far-reaching, but as will be argued in infra Part III.B of this Comment, not as sweeping
as the detention provisions found under ATCSA. Non-citizens who engage in political activities
in connection with any organization risk being certified as terrorists and subject to potentially
indefinite detention whether on a technical immigration violation or on terrorism grounds.253 In
addition, non-citizens are unable to protect themselves from these risks by avoiding association
with organizations that have been designated as “terrorist organizations” because the Act
expands that term to include undesignated and undefined grounds.254 Non-citizens cannot even
protect themselves by limiting their activity to seemingly innocent behavior such as soliciting
membership for, soliciting funds for, and providing material support to a newly designated
“terrorist organization” with only the goal of promoting the organization’s lawful ends because
the Act broadens the term “engage in terrorist activity” to include exactly these types of
activities.255 Therefore, in the post-Patriot Act world, non-citizens who are intent on avoiding
the risks of being certified as a suspected terrorist and the possibility of indefinite detention
should refrain from any associations with organizations that could potentially be deemed
252
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terrorist, even if they are partaking in seemingly innocent activities.256 While the full effect of
the detention provisions of the Patriot Act have yet to be recognized, our commitment to the Bill
of Rights and to the democratic values that define the United States have undoubtedly been put
to the test by the events of September 11, 2001. Exactly how far the government can proceed in
sacrificing civil liberties in hopes of gaining an added measure of security will certainly be tested
in the upcoming months throughout the federal court system. As will be discussed below and in
detail in Part IV of this Comment, however, regardless of how the Supreme Court ultimately
rules and despite the Patriot Act’s infringement on the civil liberties of non-citizens, the
detention provisions of the Patriot Act, when compared with those of the United Kingdom’s
ATCSA, reflect a reasoned balance between both liberty and security.
2. ATCSA
Like the Patriot Act, the detention provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001 have been extensively attacked as being both unlawful and disproportionate in light of
the state of affairs in the United Kingdom since September 11, 2001. Before outlining these
criticisms in detail, however, it would be helpful to first provide a brief introduction to ECHR in
order to better understand the obligations the United Kingdom is required to fulfill as a member.
Only then can a more comprehensive analysis of whether the detention measures of ATCSA are
justifiable be undertaken.
Adopted in 1950, ECHR obligates its member countries to “secure the rights and
freedoms” of the Convention to everyone in their jurisdiction.257 Broadly speaking, ECHR
provides international protection for a variety of civil and political rights much like those
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contained in the United States Bill of Rights.258 The fundamental goal of ECHR is to promote
individuals rights and freedoms in an effort to best protect democracy.259
ECHR is comprised of various provisions. Of particular importance to the focus of this
Comment is Article 5, which addresses the detention of non-citizens. It protects against
unwarranted state intrusions upon the liberty and security of individuals by prohibiting
unjustified detentions.260 Although the member countries consider the rights and freedoms
detailed in ECHR to be fundamental to democracy, however, ECHR nevertheless contains a
public emergency exception. Article 15(1) of ECHR provides that “in times of war or other
public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measure
derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation ….”261 In reviewing a member country’s declaration of a public
emergency under Article 15, the European Court has consistently maintained that it plays a
limited role in the review of a member country’s derogation under Article 15.262 The Court
instead grants member countries a margin of appreciation recognizing that each member state is
primarily responsible for its own survival and stability.263 Because individual governments have
continuous and direct contact with the everyday conditions of the state and therefore are in the
best position to make such a determination, the Court requires each member country to
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determine the severity of the threat to the nation and allows the country to determine the scope of
the measures which are necessary to monitor the situation.264
In Lawless v. Ireland,265 the Court entertained a challenge by an Irish individual who at
one time was a member of the IRA and then, according to his own account, left that organization
fewer than five months later.266 Nevertheless, he was detained without trial for a period of
almost six months.267 The European Court held that detaining Lawless violated his right to
liberty Article 5 of ECHR.268 Therefore, it was essential to examine if the detention could be
justified under the provisions of Article 15.
In Lawless, the Commission defined, and the Court agreed, that a public emergency for
the purposes of Article 15 of ECHR is a situation of exceptional and imminent danger or crisis
affecting the general public, as distinct from particular groups, and constituting a threat to the
organized life of the community which composes the State in question.269 This definition was
further developed by the Commission, which in the 1969 case of Denmark, Norway, Sweden &
the Netherlands v. Greece270( the “Greek Case”) held that in order to satisfy Article 15, a public
emergency had to be “actual or imminent,” its effects had to “involve the whole nation,” the
continuance of the organized life of the community must be threatened,” and the crisis or danger
must be “exceptional,” in that normal measures were “plainly inadequate.”271

264

See id.
1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 (1979-80). For an in-depth analysis of the Court’s ruling in Lawless see
generally BRIAN DOOLAN, LAWLESS V. IRELAND (1957-1961): THE FIRST CASE BEFORE THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE? (2001).
266
Lawless, 1Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17.
267
Id.
268
Id. at 37.
269
See id. at 30.
270
1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 1.
271
1 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE GREEK CASE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(1969).
265

59

Applying the rules of Lawless and the Greek case to the present state of affairs, it is
difficult to conclude that the current climate in the United Kingdom amounts to the type of
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation. First, it is important to note that despite
the supposed present international “war on terrorism,” the United Kingdom is the only one of the
forty-one member states to have ratified the Convention which has found it necessary to derogate
from the terms of ECHR over this matter.272 It is thus somewhat doubtful that the current state
of affairs in the United Kingdom could constitute a public emergency within the meaning of
ECHR.273 The attacks on the United States have ended and there has yet to be an attack on the
United Kingdom. Therefore, while it may be accurate to say there is a concern and that the
United Kingdom should remain alert, it is questionable if there is a public emergency in the
United Kingdom at this time.274
Furthermore, even if it was determined that a public emergency does presently exist in
the United Kingdom, it is even more difficult to conclude that the detention measures contained
in Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 are absolutely necessary. It appears that the
measures implemented in relation to the detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism are not
commensurate with the current situation in the United Kingdom.275 The current situation appears
distinguishable from Northern Ireland’s position in Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom,
where the Court held that the United Kingdom’s derogation from Article 5 was in fact
justified.276 Whereas between 1972 and 1992 there were some 3,000 deaths and over 40,000
terrorist incidents attributed to terrorism in Northern Ireland, there have been no terrorist
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incidents in the United Kingdom directly associated with what happened in the United States on
September 11, 2001.277 In fact, in January 2002, shortly after the passing of ATCSA, the Home
Secretary confirmed in Parliament that there was “no immediate intelligence pointing to a
specific threat to the United Kingdom.”278
In addition, even if the government was to prevail on the public emergency argument, it
would have to prove to the satisfaction of the Court, that the continuing operational effectiveness
of the al-Qaida network poses an immediate and specific threat to the United Kingdom which is
nonetheless serious enough so that the nation should regard itself as being in a state of
emergency.279 Even if this argument were to succeed, it is probable that the breadth of the
coercive powers contained in Part 4 of ATCSA would make it difficult to establish that the
detention measures contained in the Act are strictly necessary.280 The detention provisions are
not limited only to those persons who pose a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom as a result of
the September 11, 2001 attacks. Instead, the Act covers all non-citizens suspected of terrorism,
not just those responsible for the attacks in the United States.281 Thus, the expansive nature of
the detention measures contained in Part 4 of ATCSA will make it difficult to show that the
provisions contained in the Act are strictly necessary to respond to the attacks of September 11,
2001.
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In short, ATCSA is a momentous piece of legislation that conferred great power,
arguably, too much power, to the state, especially in the areas of deportation and detention
without trial. Undoubtedly, the power to indefinitely detain will adversely affect non-citizen
nationals suspected by the Secretary of State of involvement in terrorism but who cannot be
deported. Furthermore, it is probable that innocent people are likely to be rounded up as well in
the search for suspected non-citizen terrorists.282 Whether these new laws are justified and
proportionate in light of the current situation in the United Kingdom as well as how these laws
should be used have been popular matters of debate and causes of concern since the laws’
passing.283 At this point, it is still too early to attempt to assess the legal and political impact of
ATCSA as it remains to be seen what kind of use will be made of the detention powers outlined
in the above discussion. While many of ATCSA’s provisions are seemingly identical to those
found under the Patriot Act, however, the detention provisions under the Act are considerably
more suspect than those of its American counterpart. As this Comment will argue in Part IV, the
way in which the United Kingdom responded to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 poses
an unjustifiable threat to the freedom and civil liberty of non-British nationals in the United
Kingdom and proceeds too far in the name of national security.
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IV. THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001: REASONED
RESPONSES OR OVERREACTIONS?
A. USA Patriot Act
1. Will the Supreme Court Uphold a Challenge to the Patriot Act’s Detention Provisions?
Unquestionably, the U.S. government has a compelling interest in responding to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Whether these interests justify broad restrictions such as
the indefinite detention of non-citizens suspected of terrorism has yet to be determined, however.
Surely restrictions such as this raise serious constitutional concerns. Nevertheless, as will be
discussed below, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the executive’s extraordinary
powers to protect national security and it is unlikely that the current “war” on terror will be an
exception. Thus, it is not only possible, but probable that the detention provisions of the Patriot
Act would pass constitutional muster. Furthermore, this Comment will argue that the Patriot
Act’s detention provisions, while possibly hostile to the traditional civil liberties of non-citizens
in the United States, are more justifiable than the detention provisions enacted by the United
Kingdom under ATCSA. In addition, not only are the detention measures under the Patriot Act
reasoned responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, but they may be necessary responses
in this uncertain time. While history tells us that in our fight for freedom we may inevitably
impinge upon certain civil liberties, history also reassures us that these emergency measures have
had no lasting effect on American society once our battles have been won and peace has been
restored.284 In fact, the Patriot Act, with its explicit safeguards, may illustrate how previous
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infringements on civil liberties have heightened our sensitivity to the importance of protecting
civil liberties. It must be recognized that if we lose our fight against terrorism, the civil liberties
of all people, citizens and non-citizens alike, will no longer survive.285 Nevertheless, it cannot be
ignored that detention theories are inherently flawed and thus, in the long term, the detention
provisions under the Patriot Act, while possibly reasoned responses in the name of liberty and
security, may ultimately fail in their goal to eliminate the terrorist threat to the United States.
It is not a matter of if, but instead a question of when, the power to potentially
indefinitely detain a non-citizen found under § 412 of the Patriot Act will be challenged in the
Supreme Court as a violation of the non-citizen’s Fifth Amendment due process rights. In
predicting how the Court would resolve the constitutionality of the Patriot Act’s detention
provisions, it is important to remember the track record of the judiciary. The judiciary has
consistently deferred to the wishes of the political branches of government during times of crisis
by finding the state interest in national security to be paramount to competing interests.286 For
instance, during the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln established military courts to try
those sympathizing with the Confederacy and suspended habeas corpus.287 Similarly, during
World War I, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Eugene Debs for expressing his antiwar sentiment.288 More recently, following the bombing of Pearl Harbor during World War II,
the Supreme Court upheld an executive order which mandating the internment of both Japanese
citizens and non-citizens based solely on their ancestry.289 While the current “war” on terrorism
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differs from in that the “war” on terrorism is not being waged against any particular nation and
because Congress has not declared war as required by Article I of the Constitution,290 the
Supreme Court would likely draw an analogy between these historical instances and the current
state of affairs.
The Supreme Court decided long ago that a formal declaration of war is not necessary for
the Executive to wage war.291 During the Civil War, in determining what constituted a war the
Court held in The Prize Cases292 that “war has been well defined to be that state in which a
nation prosecutes its right by force.”293 In addition, the Court found that “war may exist without
a declaration on either side” and that “it is not necessary to constitute war, that both parties
should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States.”294 Just like there was no
formal declaration of war preceding the Civil War, in the current “war” on terrorism, Congress
has made the functional equivalent of a declaration of war in it authorization of the use of force
against al-Qaida.295 Therefore, as in The Prize Cases, this type of authorization may be
sufficient for the Supreme Court to analogize the current state of affairs to instances where there
were more traditional declarations of war and for the Court to take judicial notice that a state of
war exists.296
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During World War II the United States was once again faced with a threat to national
security when members of the German armed forces, carrying explosive, fuses, and timing
devices, secretly proceeded in a submarine to the coast of the United States.297 Similar to
government’s considerations in passing the Patriot Act, concerned that the current laws were not
sufficient to protect the United States from these types of individuals, President Roosevelt
quickly issued an order establishing a military commission298 for the trial of the saboteurs.299 All
eight German soldiers who landed in the United States were tried before the military
commission, with six eventually being sentenced to death.300
Following their convictions, the German soldiers filed a petition for habeas corpus to
challenge the constitutionality of their trial by military commission.301 In Ex parte Quirin, 302 the
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Supreme Court convened in a special term to hear arguments in the case of the petitioners. Not
surprisingly, the court dismissed the petitioner’s arguments and upheld their convictions
reasoning that the President’s wartime detention decisions are to be accorded great deference
from the courts.303 The opinion also established the presumption that presidential actions taken
pursuant to the commander in chief power during wartime are valid, unless those actions are
clearly in conflict with the Constitution.304 Chief Justice Stone wrote, “[T]he detention and trial
of petitioners—ordered by the President in the declared exercise as Commander in Chief of the
Army in time of war and of grave public danger—are not to be set aside by the courts without
the clear conviction” that they are in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.305
While true that the situation in which President Roosevelt authorized military
commissions can be distinguished from state of affairs which precipitated the passing of the
Patriot Act, a close reading of Quirin supports the contention that the Supreme Court would
likely uphold the detention provisions of the Patriot Act. In contrast to the invasion of the
German soldiers and the circumstances which existed when President Roosevelt promulgated his
order, the United States was not in the state of an armed conflict on the morning of September
11, 2001, prior to the attacks. In addition, unlike World War II, despite the president’s
proclaimed “war on terrorism” the United States is not officially at war. Nevertheless, the
severity of the September 11 attacks, in both their purpose and effect, undoubtedly commenced a
state of “quasi-war” in the United States. The decision of the Supreme Court in Quirin clearly
illustrates that during times of conflict and increased national security, civil liberties are not high
priorities for the judges. Furthermore, the Court’s decision in Quirin regarding the
302
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appropriateness of the use of military tribunals primarily turned on the particular facts in the case
including, the time in which the events in the case took place, the identity of the offenders, and
the state of affairs of the nation. This reasoning, when applied to the appropriateness of the
detention provisions of the Patriot Act, supports the detention of non-citizens suspected of
terrorism in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
In another famous World War II case, Korematsu v. United States,306 the Court upheld
the evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry to relocation centers.307 Korematsu was convicted
of disobeying the order by remaining in an area contrary to the order.308 In a short ten-page
opinion the Court affirmed his conviction and held that the evacuation of people of Japanese
ancestry was necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members
of the group.309 In affirming his conviction the Court noted “the validity of action under the war
power must be judged wholly in the context of war. That action is not to be stigmatized as
lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless.”310 The decision of the Court in
Korematsu confirms the fact that judges are wary to strike down wartime measures during times
of conflict and when the national security of the United States is threatened. Thus, there is little
reason to believe that the Supreme Court would depart from this line of decisions when
interpreting the detention provisions of the Patriot Act.
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Finally, and most significantly for determining the fate of the Patriot Act’s detention
provisions, there is the decision of the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, which came down less than
three months before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.311
Zadvydas v. Davis combined two cases that had led to opposite results in the courts of
appeals. Both cases involved non-citizens who had enjoyed the status of lawful permanent
resident after arriving in the United States as children.312 Kestutis Zadvydas was a non-citizen
resident of the United States who was born to Lithuanian parents in a German displaced persons
camp.313 After a drug conviction, he served two years in prison and was detained thereafter by
the INS which ordered his removal.314 Because both Germany and Lithuania refused to accept
Zadvydas as their own citizen, however, the INS held him beyond the ninety-day removal period
allowed by the statute.315 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit upheld the statute reasoning that
although Zadvydas’s status as a permanent resident afforded him greater procedural due process
rights, this status did not afford him greater substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.316
In essence the court refused, at least for detention purposes, to recognize a meaningful distinction
between deportable non-citizens subject to final orders of removal and excludable noncitizens.317 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit found that Zadvydas’s continued detention did not
constitute “permanent confinement” because his removal was not an absolute impossibility and
because he could be released upon a determination that he no longer represented a flight risk or
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danger to the community.318 Therefore, because Zadvydas failed to sustain his burden to the INS
by proving that he was not dangerous and releasable, and as long that the INS provided a
procedure for periodic review of releasability coupled with good faith efforts to effectuate
deportation, ongoing detention did not violate the Constitution.319
Similar to Zadvydas, Kim Ho Ma came to the United States from Cambodia and had been
a resident non-citizen since the age of seven.320 After being convicted of manslaughter, he spent
a little over two years in prison where upon release he was placed into the custody of the INS to
begin removal proceedings.321 The INS detained Ma beyond the ninety-day period because
Cambodia would not accept him.322 In contrast to the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Zadvydas,
however, the Ninth Circuit refused to uphold the statute.323 Instead, the court construed the INA
to prohibit detention for more than a “reasonable time” beyond the ninety-day removal period.324
The court found that where, as in Ma’s case, no reasonable likelihood of removal exists, the
statute did not authorize detention beyond ninety days.325
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to resolve the circuit split,
consolidated them, vacated and remanded.326 The majority held that any law allowing the
indefinite detention of deportable non-citizens would raise substantial constitutional concerns.327
To survive a constitutional challenge, the court reasoned that indefinite civil detention must
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occur in “non-punitive circumstances” where a “special justification” exists.328 Even assuming
that the objectives for detaining individuals such as Zadvydas and Ma were non-punitive, the
Court found no sufficient compelling special justification for their indefinite confinement once
the likelihood of their repatriation became remote.329 In addition, the majority was not persuaded
by the governments’ justifications for detention. The government’s first justification for
detention—preventing flight from removal proceedings—did not constitute enough of a
justification for continued INS detention.330 Similarly, while the Court acknowledged that the
government’s second justification—protecting the community from harm—was valid, the Court
stressed that preventative detention based on dangerousness would be permitted only when it is
imposed on highly dangerous individuals and only if there are “strong procedural protections” in
place.331 The majority was skeptical of the INA’s post-order detention provision because it
applied to a broad range of non-citizens rather than a narrow segment of the population, and
because it offered minimal procedural protections.332
Nevertheless, in order to avoid finding the post-order provision unconstitutional, the
Court construed the statute to permit incarceration beyond the ninety-day period only as long as
removal remained “reasonably foreseeable.”333 In doing so, the majority established a
presumption that detention of a deportable non-citizen is reasonable for six months following a
final order of removal.334 After that time, the detained non-citizen may petition the government
for release by showing “good reason” to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal
328

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
See id; see also Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1923.
330
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see also Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 1923.
331
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see also Plight of the Tempest-Tost, supra note 43, at 192324.
332
See id. at 691-92; 1923-24.
333
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
329

71

in the reasonably foreseeable future.335 The government must rebut such a showing to continue
holding the non-citizen in custody.336
Despite the Court’s expression of serious doubt about the constitutionality of the INA’s
post-order detention mandate, however, the majority did recognize, in language that now appears
prescient, that the cases before it did not require it “to consider terrorism or other special
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventative detention and
for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of
national security.”337 In doing so, the Court essentially carved out a potential exception for
certain non-citizen terrorists and recognized that terrorism creates a type of public fear that may
not be present with other national threats of security. The acknowledgement by the majority of
the genuine danger represented by terrorism or other exceptional circumstances seems to eerily
foreshadow the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent struggles our nation is now
faced with following the unprecedented attacks. While lessons from the past may counsel
against such a rule that affords heightened judicial deference to the political branches in cases
that implicate national security, this loophole created by the majority undoubtedly gives the
political branches room to maneuver and for the Supreme Court to utilize detention in the current
war on terrorism. The Zadvydas decision therefore would not require the release of non-citizens
held on allegations of terrorism who have no prospect of being able to return to their home
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country. What the Patriot Act appears to do is effectively codify this exception requiring the
continued detention of removable non-citizens suspected of terrorism.338
The Patriot Act’s provisions on indefinite detention for certified non-citizens suspected of
terrorism are likely to be ruled constitutional given both the current heightened popular
awareness of the national security threat posed by non-citizens living in the United States with
the intent to perpetrate terrorist attacks against Americans and because the detention provisions
of the Act exceed the Zadvydas standard regarding suspected terrorists held on an indefinite
basis. First, § 412(b) specifically provides judicial review of suspected non-citizen terrorists
held on an indefinite basis.339 Second, the new law proscribes fixed time limits for review of the
Attorney General’s initial certification. Section 412(a)(6) provides that an alien whose “removal
is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future may be detained for additional periods of up to
six months if release threatens national security or the safety of an individual or community.”340
In addition, § 412(a)(7) requires the Attorney General to review the certification every six
months and allows the suspected non-citizen terrorist to request a reconsideration of the
certification every six months.341 It is only if all these provisions are satisfied that the terrorist
suspect may be subject to potential indefinite detention. Therefore, if the Court stands by its
decision in Zadvydas and follows precedent of this decision and other decisions passed down in
times of crisis, it is unlikely that the detention provisions of the Patriot Act will be struck down
as an unconstitutional infringement on the rights of non-citizens.342
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2. Are the Detention Provisions of the Patriot Act Justifiable?
Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. During this uncertain time, it is
impossible for the United States to predict the future with any type of certainty. History has
warned us that in a struggle against evil, the traditional civil liberties of some individuals may
have to be curtailed. Nevertheless, history also assures us that once the emergency is over, the
provisions which adversely compromised traditional civil liberties will be eliminated and peace
can be restored.343
The detention provisions of the Patriot Act, while certainly hostile to the traditional civil
liberties of non-citizens, can be defended as a reasoned and justifiable response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. While the provisions do subject more individuals than ever to
deportation on terrorism grounds due to the newly expanded definitions of the terms “terrorist
activity” and “terrorist organization,” safeguards have been built into the Patriot Act in an effort
to adequately protect non-citizens from the possibility of arbitrary indefinite detention. Some of
these protections include a limitation on the Attorney General’s power to delegate his
certification power to the Deputy Attorney General alone,344 a requirement to initiate removal
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proceedings or bring criminal charges within seven days of the commencement of detention,345 a
limitation on the detention of non-citizens who cannot be removed and those non-citizens who
are waiting to be removed if it is determined that the release of these non-citizens would threaten
national security or public safety,346 mandatory review of certification by the Attorney General
every six months,347 and a provision for judicial review through the filing of a habeas petition
and appeals.348
Finally, and quite possibly most significantly, in contrast to the situation in the United
Kingdom, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were perpetrated on American soil. After
the attacks, it was discovered that the State Department had issued visas to all nineteen hijackers
responsible for the terrorist attacks.349 These lapses in immigration law enforcement brought to
light how our relatively open borders and open society make us an easy target for terrorist
activity. Consequently, the federal government was forced to take action fast. While the
detention of non-citizens as authorized under the Patriot Act may not be the best solution or even
the most effective approach to combat terrorism, it represents a reasoned response to a difficult
situation. After all, if the United States does not fight terrorism, civil liberties as a whole will not
survive as there will be no one left to fight for freedom and democracy.350 The civil liberty that
the United States government should focus on at this crucial time is that of all people, both
American and non-Americans, to live their live free from the threat of terrorism.351 This is a
priority that surely factored into the United States government reasoning when enacting the
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detention provisions of the Patriot Act. Nevertheless, while the continuing threat posed by
terrorism may justify the detention provisions, the United States must remain mindful that if and
when the situation stabilizes, the detention measures should be reviewed to ensure that the civil
liberties of non-citizens are not unnecessarily being truncated.352 In addition, even given the
continuing threat new of terrorist attacks, it is essential for the United States to abide by the
explicit safeguards which have been outlined in the Patriot Act to protect against the possibility
of potential arbitrary indefinite detention.353
B. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
1. Will the European Court Uphold the United Kingdoms Derogation from ECHR under
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001?
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s potential reasoning in upholding the Patriot Act,
it is questionable whether the European Court would rule that the detention provisions of Anti352

This Comment is not arguing that the threat of terrorism will be eradicated anytime soon or
even that it will ever be completely eliminated. The development of international terrorism has
placed the world under a real and most likely permanent threat. In fact, this view is supported by
President Bush himself who believes it is going to be way beyond our lifetimes before the war on
terrorism comes to an end. See Padilla v. Bush No. 02 Civ. 4445, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23086,
at *10-13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2002) (summarizing the government's June 11, 2002 arguments in
reply to Padilla's then-pending motion to vacate the material witness statute). Instead, what this
Comment is arguing is that the new and expanded detention powers under the Patriot Act should
by both limited in time and confined to periods of emergency and uncertainty.
353
Most notably, the United States government must ensure that non-citizens certified as
terrorists have access to the judicial review procedures explicitly outlined in the Patriot Act
which enable certified terrorists to file a habeas petition to protest their certification and
detention. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, § 412 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a). In
addition, it is important that the Attorney General review the certification of each non-citizen
every six months without exception. See id. Finally, it is mandatory that the Attorney General
submit reports to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate every six months regarding: (1) the number of noncitizens detained under these provisions; (2) the grounds for the certifications; (3) the
nationalities of those non-citizens certified; (4) the length of the detention for each certified noncitizen; and (5) the number of non-citizens certified who—(A) were granted relief from removal;

76

terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 are valid. Irrespective of a specific terrorist threat or
independent terrorist attack against the United Kingdom, because of the nation’s relationship to
the United States, it cannot be ignored that the nation is a target for terrorist activity. While true
that traditionally the United Kingdom has been afforded great deference when addressing
terrorist threats and while there are purported safeguards contained within ATCSA to ensure that
the detention provisions of the Act are reviewed and remain temporary, the European Court will
most likely find that the detention provisions of ATCSA have proceeded too far in the name of
national security and rule that the United Kingdom has not made a valid derogation from ECHR
under Article 15. Given the current state of affairs in the United Kingdom, unlike the Patriot
Act, not only are the detention measures of ATCSA unnecessary and disproportionate, they also
fail to provide adequate procedural safeguards to protect non-citizens from arbitrary detention.
While from the beginning, both the European Court and Commission have indicated that
they will not abdicate jurisdiction over Article 15 questions, both have assumed an extremely
deferential attitude towards governmental assertions of conformity with requirements of Article
15.354 Governments historically fare well when their decisions concerning the existence of a
particular situation of emergency are reviewed by the European Court. Nevertheless, in regards
to the United Kingdom’s recent derogation, there is reason to believe that the Court would rule
differently.355

(B) were removed; (C) the Attorney General had determined are no longer non-citizens who
should be certified; or (D) were released from detention. See id.
354
Gross, supra note 98, at 492.
355
See id. at 493. The traditional deference shown to member countries is the result of such
factors as tremendous delays in bringing cases before the Commission and the Court, the lack of
a fact-finding mechanism for the Commission and the Court, and the restriction on the
Commission and the Court to initiate an investigation into a specific situation in a state party.
Instead, procedural rules require the Commission and the Court to await a formal application by
another state party to the Convention or by an individual. Id. However, it is the doctrine of the
77

Several significant cases have come before the European Court of Human Rights and the
European Commission on Human Rights356 that have judged the efforts of the United Kingdom
to control terrorism in Northern Ireland within the constraints of ECHR.357 For the purposes of
this Comment, only those cases which addressed the detention provisions of the United
Kingdom’s terrorist legislation after the passing of Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary

“margin of appreciation” which is the main mechanism by which this deferential attitude is
implemented. This doctrine and the jurisprudence developed around it have resulted in bringing
a significant element of subjectivity into the identification of public emergencies and as a result
have undermined the ability of European Commission and Court to formulate rules based on
strict requirements opting instead for vague standards that increase the leeway for discretion and
flexibility. Id. at 495.
The margin of appreciation doctrine essentially means that when reviewing whether a
public emergency exists in a particular case or whether certain governmental emergency
measures were in fact “strictly necessary,” the Commission and the Court will generally not
interfere with the state’s judgment on the matter if it falls within a certain margin of appreciation.
Id. at 496. If in derogating a state’s appreciation is at least on the margin of its powers under
Article 15, the Commission and Court usually rules in its favor. Id. The rationale is that in such
cases the public’s interest in an effective government and in the maintenance of order should
prevail and that the national government is in the best position to balance the conflicting
considerations of the public interest and complex factors involved in preserving law and order in
the face of public emergency. Id. This is because the national government is presumed to be
more familiar than the Commission or the Court with the particular circumstances which face the
nation. Id. at 497. In fact, invalidating a state’s judgment on a matter is only possible when the
judgment is entirely outside the margin. Id. Thus, as it is nearly impossible to obtain a decision
against the national government in situations alleged to amount to “public emergencies
threatening the life of a nation,” there is little reason to believe that the previous practices of the
Commission and Court in avoiding an independent review of the evidence and the tendency to
succumb to the position of the national government will be abandoned in addressing the
detention provisions under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. See id.
356
Both the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights
were established under Article 19 of ECHR. See ECHR, supra note 14, art. 19. The
Commission may start an investigation into a complaint alleging that a State Party has violated
ECHR upon an interstate complaint (i.e., a complaint filed by another member state) under
Article 24 of ECHR or upon an application of an individual. See id. arts. 4-25. If an application
is found to be admissible by the Commission, the Commission first attempts to achieve a friendly
settlement between the parties. See id. art. 30. In the case where no settlement can be reached,
the Commission then has the ability to refer the case to the Court. For a more detailed
explanation of how ECHR and the European Court and Commission function, see generally
JANIS ET AL., supra note 206 (providing a broad overview of how the European System operates).
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Provisions) Act of 1974 (PTA 1974) and Northern Ireland (Emergency Procedures) Act of 1973
(EPA 1973) will be addressed here.358
Article 5.3 of ECHR provides that everyone lawfully arrested or detained “shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power,
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.”359 The issue in
Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom360 involved four individuals who were arrested under §
12 of PTA as amended in 1984.361 These individuals were detained between four and six days
under PTA on suspicion of involvement in Northern Ireland terrorism.362 This section of PTA
proscribed the IRA and in § 12(1) provided that a law enforcement agent could arrest without
warning any person whom he had reasonable grounds for suspecting to be a terrorist.363 Section
12(4) provided for forty-eight hours initial detention and § 12(5) provided that detention could be
357

See generally JACKSON, supra note 6 (studying the conflicts which have arisen between the
United Kingdom, the European Court and ECHR).
358
In 1971, prior to the enactment of either the 1973 EPA or the 1974 PTA, in the case of Ireland
v. United Kingdom, the Irish government contended that measures such as the detention and
internment without trial as well as certain interrogation techniques introduced under the Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 violated Articles 3, 5, and 6 of ECHR.
The Commission concluded that although the powers of detention and internment did violate the
provisions of Article 5 of the European Convention, this detention without trial could be justified
under Article 15 as being strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. In addition, the
Commission concluded that the use of certain interrogation techniques such as depravation of
food and standing against a wall amounted to torture under Article 3 of ECHR. See Ireland v.
United Kingdom 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1979-80). This decision focused primarily on the
interrogation techniques and procedures used by Britain rather than on the powers of detention.
What is significant, however, is that the decision in Ireland both affirmatively recognized that an
emergency did in fact exist in the United Kingdom, even though there was a continuous crisis
and not a temporary public emergency. Additionally, it is important to recognize the expansion
of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the Commission in this case. Both of these factors may
have direct implications on how the European Court would rule on the detention provisions of
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. See Gross, supra note 98, at 469-73.
359
See ECHR, supra note 14, art. 5.
360
11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (1989).
361
See Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 120-22.
362
See id.
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extended by five additional days.364 None of the four was brought before a judge and none was
charged after subsequent release.365 Brogan and the other three detainees argued that their
detention violated Article 5.3 of ECHR because they were not taken before a magistrate.
The European Court of Human Rights concluded that the extrajudicial powers of arrest
and detention contained in PTA were incompatible with the United Kingdom’s obligations under
ECHR.366 Being that none of the four suspects was brought immediately before a judge, the
European Court had a fairly easy time of finding a breach of Article 5.3. The European Court
ruled that even the shortest period for which one of the four individuals had been held, four days
and six hours, violated ECHR.367
The British government, obviously dejected with the court’s ruling, insisted that it needed
to retain the seven day detention period found under PTA.368 In response, Britain announced that
it would derogate from its ECHR obligations under Article 15:369
There have been in the United Kingdom in recent years campaigns of organized terrorism
connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland which have manifested themselves in
activities which have included repeated murder, attempted murder, maiming, intimidation
and violent civil disturbance and in bombing and fire raising which have resulted in
death, injury and widespread destruction of property. As a result, a public emergency
within the meaning of Article 15(1) of the Convention exists in the United Kingdom.370
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See id. at 122; see also JACKSON, supra note 6, at 48-9.
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See Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 122; see also Gross, supra note 98, at 477.
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See Patricia M. Roche, The United Kingdom’s Obligation to Balance Human Rights and its
Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Case of Brogan and Others, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 328, 346
(1989-90).
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See Brogan, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 135-36; see also Gross, supra note 98, at 477.
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See DONAHUE, supra note 6, at 260.
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See id. Article 15 is a public emergency exception contained in ECHR which allows member
countries to derogate from their obligations under ECHR under certain circumstances. See
ECHR, supra note 14, art. 15. Article 15 was discussed more extensively in Part III.B.3 of this
Comment and is useful to keep in mind when analyzing the detention provisions of ATCSA and
determining the validity of the British government’s derogation from ECHR in passing the Act.
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Adhering to the European Court’s reasoning in Brogan, it seems likely that the detention
provisions of ATCSA would be found to violate ECHR. In Brogan, the Court held that the fact
that a detained person is not charged or brought before a court does not in itself amount to a
violation of ECHR.371 In addition, the court believed that a violation of ECHR could not arise if
the arrested person was released promptly before any judicial review of his detention would have
been feasible.372 If the detained person was not released promptly, however, the court held that
he would be entitled to an appearance before a judge or judicial officer.373 In assessing and
interpreting notion of “promptness” the court recognized the special problems associated with
the investigation of terrorist offenses.374 Nevertheless, the court did not believe that the terrorist
threat which faced the United Kingdom justified the disposal of prompt judicial control.375 Thus,
the court adhered to a narrow interpretation of the meaning of the word “promptness” in order to
ensure that the rights of detained individuals were protected.376 Under this interpretation, even
the four days and six hours spent in police custody by one of the detainees was outside the strict
constraints as to the time permitted by ECHR.377
Applying the considerations of the Court in Brogan to ATCSA, it is unlikely that the
Court would uphold the detention provisions of Part 4. ATCSA contains no explicit provision
which requires the Secretary of State to commence proceedings within a certain period of time.
A non-citizen could therefore be held for an indefinite period of time without being charged with
any type of immigration violation or criminal activity. Thus, the Court would likely conclude
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that individuals held pursuant to the detention provisions of ATCSA are not brought promptly
before a judicial authority or released promptly following their arrest. Identical to the Court’s
reasoning in Brogan, “the undoubted fact that the arrest and detention of the applicant were
inspired by the legitimate aim of protecting the community as a whole from terrorism is not on
its own sufficient to ensure compliance with the specific requirements of Article 5(3).”378
In addition, as noted by the Court in Brogan, the remedy of habeas corpus was available
to the applicants in that case.379 Thus, even though they did not avail themselves of such
proceedings, the detained individuals in Brogan did have an opportunity to have the lawfulness
of their arrest and detention reviewed by a competent court.380 Under ATCSA, however, those
detained under Part 4 are not afforded the safeguard of habeas corpus. Instead, ATCSA
precludes regular judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decisions under §§ 21 and 23 and
allows these decisions only to be questions in legal proceedings before the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission (SIAC).381 Thus, unlike the detained individuals in Brogan, those arrested
and detained under ATCSA have no right to bring proceedings in order to have a court quickly
determine the lawfulness of their detention.
The validity of the British government’s derogation from ECHR was subsequently
challenged in Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom,382 once again by detainees who were
contesting the length of their detention. After being arrested in 1989, Brannigan was held
altogether for more than six days while McBride was held for more than four days before both
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men were released without charge.383 The facts of this case were, therefore, substantially similar
to those of Brogan. This time, however, the British government conceded that Article 5(3)’s
promptness requirement was not met but invoked as a defense to the derogation notice it
submitted following the European Court’s decision in Brogan, claiming that the Article 5(3)
violation was justified under Article 15.384
The detainees argued that given the “quasi-permanent” nature of the state of emergency
in Northern Ireland, the margin of appreciation385 accorded the United Kingdom should be
narrowed, especially given the court’s ruling in Brogan that judicial review was one of the
fundamental requirements of a democratic society.386 Despite this argument, the majority of the
European Court instead adopted a broad conception of the margin of appreciation and found in
the United Kingdom’s favor. According to the preconditions for derogation387 that (1) there
existed a “war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation,” (2) the derogation
was “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,” and (3) the measures were not
inconsistent with the State’s other international obligations, the court determined that the
383

See Gross, supra note 98, at 480. Unfortunately, McBride was killed before the European
Court could rule on his case. He was one of three people killed at a Sinn Fein Center by an RUC
officer, who killed himself as well a few hours after the murders. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at
54.
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See Brannigan, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 551-52.
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The European Court has consistently held that the court plays a limited role in review of a
member country’s declaration of a public emergency under Article 15. The Court generally
grants member countries this margin of appreciation because it recognizes that each member
state is primarily responsible for its own survival and stability. That is not to say however that
member nations enjoy absolute deference from the Court regarding the scope of derogation from
their obligations under ECHR. For a more in-depth discussion of the margin of appreciation and
how it operates see Part V of this comment. See also Gross, supra note 98, at 495-99. See
generally Nicholas Lavender, The Problem of the Margin of Appreciation, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
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derogation was valid.388 It decided that as far as the “strictly required” question was concerned,
the government had not overstepped its margin of appreciation in its decision to exclude judicial
control as part of the process of extending detention.389 The court concluded that adequate and
effective safeguards existed against potential abuse of the arrest and detention powers given to
the government’s agents.390
While there are similarities between the circumstances in Brannigan and the current state
of affairs in the United Kingdom, there are also differences which distinguish the detention
provisions under ATCSA and thus make it likely that the Court, even despite their ruling in
Brannigan, would strike down the detention measures of ATCSA. In finding that the United
Kingdom had not exceeded their margin of appreciation, the Court strongly emphasized the
various effective safeguards which were imbedded in the legislation at issue in Brannigan.391
The Court felt that these safeguards provided an important measure of protection against
arbitrary detention.392 In contrast, these safeguards that the Court relied on in upholding the
United Kingdom’s derogation in Brannigan, are glaringly absent from ATCSA.
First, the remedy of habeas corpus available in Brannigan, which was readily available to
test the lawfulness of the original arrest and detention, does not exist under ATCSA.393 Second,
unlike those detained in Brannigan, individuals detained under ATCSA do not have an absolute
and legally enforceable right to consult a solicitor after forty-eight hours from the time of
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arrest.394 Instead, because of the unconventional procedure before SIAC, an individual’s legal
representatives will be chosen for him by the Attorney-General (or other appropriate law officer)
and will not be responsible to the individual.395 Third, the Court in Brannigan recognized that
the legislation at issue had been kept under regular independent review and that it was subject to
regular renewal.396 While ATCSA does contain a review provision and requires that there be a
review of the detention provisions by a person appointed by the Secretary of State within
fourteen months of ATCSA’s coming into force,397 as well as provide for the expiration of the
detention provisions fifteen months after ATCSA’s enactment,398 the effectiveness of these
provisions has yet to be seen. In addition, the review provisions of ATCSA are distinguishable
from the legislation at issue in Brannigan, as the review of the detention provisions under
ATCSA are not subject to independent review. Instead, it is the Secretary of State, the same
individual who determines who will and will not be certified as a terrorist under ATCSA, who
appoints a person to review the legislation.399 Furthermore, while § 29 does provide that the
detention provisions will expire after fifteen months, the Secretary of State (by order subject to
approval by both Houses), can revive the detention provisions.400
Finally, the Court in Brannigan recognized the limited scope of the derogation and how it
was designed to address the specific terrorist threat posed by Northern Ireland.401 In Brannigan,
the derogation was in response to organized terrorism directly connected to the affairs of the
British Government. This terrorism was occurring on a regular basis over a period of time and
394
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was directly affecting British citizens.402 Conversely, unlike the state of affairs in the United
Kingdom at the time Brannigan was decided where the derogation was a reasoned response to a
situation rooted in the everyday lives of British citizens,403 the derogation order under ATCSA
under the current circumstances does not seem justified from the view of the general British
public. Unlike the legislation in question in Brannigan, the detention provisions of ATCSA have
little to do with the recent developments in international security and are not carefully targeted at
the exceptional situation with which they were designed to deal.
In addition, the dissents of the court suggested that some of the judges on the European
Court were growing tired of the persistent state of emergency and consequent derogations in
Northern Ireland. For example, Judge Pettiti of France refused to concede that the independence
of judge might be undermined by participating in the decision whether or not to extend a period
of detention.404 Similarly, the dissenting opinions of Judges DeMeyer and Makarczyk and the
concurring opinions of Judges Russo and Martens together suggested that the duration of the
derogations by the United Kingdom and the expansive broadening of the margin of appreciation
granted the United Kingdom were becoming problematic.405 These opinions, while not those of
the great majority of the court, nevertheless may prove important when the European Court
finally is forced to rule on the detention provisions enacted by the Anti-Terrorism Crime Security
Act 2001.
Lending some support to the conclusion that the European Commission and Court would
possibly uphold the detention provisions contained in Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act
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2001 are the measures in place to ensure that the United Kingdom continually reviews the
necessity of the emergency powers and that the derogation from its obligations under ECHR last
only as long as the emergency lasts. ATCSA requires review of the sections concerning the
detention of suspected non-citizen terrorists and provides rules that the government must abide
by in the review process.406 These rules include specifying the number of people who must
review the sections, the timing of the review, and the presentation of a report on the review to
both the Secretary of State and Parliament.407 Furthermore, the purported temporary nature of
the detention measures will similarly be an important factor in determining whether the
Commission and Court will support the Act’s detention provisions. The Act limits the Secretary
of State’s power to certify and detain suspected non-citizen terrorists by explicitly stating that the
detention provisions found under §§ 21-23 will expire as of November 10, 2006.408 Because
these measures may help to ensure that the British government will not abuse its powers and that
the measures taken in response to the public emergency are narrowly tailored to the
circumstances required by the emergency, it is possible, although not likely, that the Commission
and Court would uphold the validity of the detention provisions.
Overall however, the lack of procedural safeguards and the highly suspect and
disproportional nature of the detention measures contained in ATCSA, makes it likely that the
European Court would not uphold the detention provisions. While the European Court has been
fairly deferential to British claims of exigency in the past and has often afforded the British a
wide margin of appreciation when the nation has been faced with similar difficult situations in
dealing with the threat posed by suspected non-citizen terrorists, the current situation is
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distinguishable from the previous terrorist threats the United Kingdom has confronted.409 While
the traditional deference consistently afforded to the United Kingdom combined with the fact
that the Act contains a clause that purportedly makes the detention of suspected non-citizen
terrorists a temporary measure,410 cannot be ignored, it is improbable that the European Court
would uphold the detention provisions as a valid and proportional response to the threat of
terrorism that exists in the United Kingdom.
2. Can the Detention Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 be
Justified?
One of the key questions regarding the passing of ATCSA and the validity of the
detention provisions has been whether the United Kingdom has correctly concluded that it faces
a public emergency within the meaning of Article 15 of ECHR and has taken only those steps
required by the circumstances of global terrorism to protect the life of the nation. As previously
discussed, the detention of a non-citizen without the intention or authority to deport him clearly
violates Article 5(1)(f) of ECHR as the Convention only permits the detention of non-citizens if
deportation proceedings have been initiated. Consequently, in order to meet their obligations
under ECHR, the United Kingdom had to declare a state of emergency to temporarily suspend its
obligations under ECHR as permitted under Article 15 of the Convention. Article 15 applies
only to an exceptional crisis or emergency situation which affects the entire population and
constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of the State.411 Therefore, despite the
fact that the European Court would afford a wide margin of discretion to the United Kingdom if
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the derogation was challenged, it is doubtful that the situation in the United Kingdom has
reached such crisis proportions as to justify derogation from ECHR.
In attempting to justify § 23 of ATCSA, which allows an individual who is certified as a
suspected terrorist, the British government explained:
Section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 contains an extended
power to arrest and detain a foreign national where it is intended to remove or deport the
person from the United Kingdom because the Secretary of State believes that his
presence is a risk to national security and suspects him of being an international terrorist,
but where such removal or deportation is not for the time being possible.412

The British Government’s explicit derogation statements emphasized that many of the
victims of the September 11 attacks were British citizens.413 The attack, however, did not target
Britons exclusively. There were victims from over seventy countries, including those nations
who are also Members states within the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, despite the fact that
these countries were equally affected by the terrorist attacks, none of them have found it
necessary to issue derogations orders from ECHR is an effort to protect its citizens from further
terrorist attacks.414 The British government failed to explain why the United Kingdom should be
more affected than other countries.415 In addition, in passing ATCSA the Government admitted
that there was no immediate intelligence pointing to a specific threat in the United Kingdom.416
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For these reasons, it is far from certain that the United Kingdom is justified in arguing that there
is currently a public emergency which threatens the lives of British citizens.
In discussing the United Kingdom’s responsibilities as a member of ECHR, it is
important to acknowledge that the power of the United Kingdom to derogate from its obligations
under ECHR is significant. This is especially evident in comparing the powers of both the
United Kingdom and the United States to protect the rights of non-citizens. The ability for the
United Kingdom to so easily and effortlessly derogate from their obligations demonstrates that
the civil liberties of non-citizens are subject to the wishes of the government.417 In contrast, in
the United States, where undoubtedly the impact of the September 11 attacks has been much
greater than that in the United Kingdom, individuals are protected through the Constitution and
through an explicit Bill of Rights which ensures that certain fundamental civil liberties cannot be
entirely curtailed.418 Furthermore, unlike in the United Kingdom, judges in the United States
have the power to strike down legislation which is unconstitutional and inconsistent with the
rights non-citizens.419 Thus, under the Patriot Act, the judicial branch effectively acts as a check
on the power of the other branches of government to protect the rights of non-citizens.
Conversely, ATCSA provides no such protection to non-citizens subject to the legislation’s
detention measures.
Furthermore, not only does Article 15(1) of ECHR require a public emergency before
allowing derogation from ECHR, but also requires that measures derogating from Government
obligations under the Convention must be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.420
In addition to § 23 discussed above, other provisions relating to the detention of non-citizens
417
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certified under the Act are clearly hard to defend as strictly necessary given the present situation
in the United Kingdom. For example, §§ 25 and 26 of ATCSA unjustifiably preclude habeas
corpus proceedings as well as exclude regular judicial review of the Secretary of State’s
decisions to certify and consequently indefinitely detain a non-citizen suspected of terrorism
without the right to a trial.421 ATCSA provides that such decisions and actions can only be
questioned in legal proceedings before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC)
and thus ousts intervention by courts.422 Furthermore, procedures before SIAC are
unconventional: The non-citizen does not have a right to either be present at the hearing or even
to be provided with the specific reasons for the decisions being made regarding his detention.423
In addition, the non-citizen has no choice of legal representation.424 Instead, his legal
representation is chosen for him by the government and is not even responsible to the noncitizen.425 Finally, and in direct contrast to the Patriot Act, which provides that a non-citizen
must be charged within seven days of being arrested, non-citizens detained pursuant to ATCSA
can be held without charge or trial for an indefinite period of time.426 The prisoner essentially is
charged and convicted of being a terrorist without the chance of even being brought before a
judge.
The United Kingdom undoubtedly faced a difficult dilemma in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 11. The government, however, failed in striking a balance between
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protecting the civil liberties of non-citizens on the one hand and preventing terrorism on the
other. In light of the above mentioned provisions of ATCSA, it is nearly impossible to conclude
that the measures implemented under Part 4 of ATCSA are commensurate with the current state
of affairs in the United Kingdom. The government essentially took advantage of the terrorist
attacks in the United States to pass a raft of coercive and disproportionate measures that are not
targeted at any exceptional situation which they were purported to address. Consequently, it is
hard to argue that the present circumstances constitute any type of emergency in the United
Kingdom or that the detention provisions in Part 4 of ATCSA are strictly necessary to deal with
the situation as it currently exists in the country. The United Kingdom should look more closely
to other countries, both those in the European Union and in particular the United States, for
alternative means of monitoring terrorist suspect without denying them the basic principles of
liberty and justice.
CONCLUSION
After September 11, 2001, the United States and the United Kingdom recognized the
vulnerability of their borders. With the passage of the Patriot Act and ATCSA, the governments
of both nations have many new tools available to combat the threat of terrorism within their
borders. With this unprecedented power, however, also comes new responsibility and the
obligation to learn from past mistakes.
Through the Patriot Act and ATCSA, the United States and the United Kingdom
respectively have resorted to trying to prevent another attack by detaining non-citizens suspected
of terrorism who are in some way associates with those who have been identified in connection
with prior terrorist activities. History has taught us, however, that the theory of internment does
not work. While a typical response to terrorism is an effort to remove dangerous factors from
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society, the detention strategy is inherently flawed because removing a volatile element from a
society does not defuse its destructive nature but merely transplants it.427 For instance, while this
strategy has been used extensively by the British in Northern Ireland, the British have found that
they have detained largely the wrong people and often even when the detentions have proved
effective, they have had to effect of alienating a much larger group than were originally
sympathetic to the terrorists.428 As Lord Dubs, a member of the British government, declared in
1998 when debating the detention provisions in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Bill:
[i]n this Bill the decision have been taken to get rid of the power of internment. Frankly
it has not worked. The government cannot see any circumstances in which they would
wish to use the power of internment. It is fundamentally a process that is against the rule
of law and undermines democratic principles. The government believe that to get rid of
the power is sensible…we do not believe that it in any way weakens the power of the
government to deal with terrorism. The use last time of internment to deal with terrorism
was a failure.429
Furthermore, irrespective of effectiveness, it is essential for the governments of the
United States and the United Kingdom to look at the effect of the detention provisions contained
in the Patriot Act and ATCSA on civil liberties as a whole. While on the one hand, these
countries must be permitted to create greater security from future attacks in an effort to protect
its own citizens, on the other hand, it is not permissible for them to trample on basic civil
liberties of non-citizens in doing so. As a result of the expanded definitions of terrorism and
terrorist activities, as well as the detention provisions contained in both the Patriot Act and
427
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ATCSA, non-citizens who are suspected of terrorism in both countries may now find themselves
subject to detention with the potential for arbitrary indefinite detention a generally available
option for both governments.
Nevertheless, despite the legitimate concerns that the internment of non-citizens
suspected of terrorism raises regarding how far the United States and the United Kingdom can
proceed in the name of national security, and besides the fact that detention is ineffective as a
means to combat terrorism, it cannot be ignored that the world is a much different place than it
was prior to September 11, 2001. Understandably, and despite the infringement of civil liberties
and freedoms, the United States and the United Kingdom were tempted by the ability to control
and restrict the rights of those who were thought to be capable of perpetrating another attack. In
comparing the Patriot Act and ATCSA, however, it becomes apparent how restrained the United
States legal response to the terrorist attacks appears. Although not directly attacked, in passing
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 the United Kingdom enacted detention measures
much more sweeping than anything found under the Patriot Act.
Assuming that public safety and a secure and civil society is the primary goal of both the
United States and the United Kingdom, the detention provisions of the Patriot Act are a wellreasoned response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the face of great stress, the
American system of checks and balances has worked relatively well to protect the United States
from another terrorist attack as well as to detain only those non-citizens who pose a legitimate
threat to the national security of the nation. That being said, however, the United States
government should not necessarily be praised for the detention measures found in the Patriot
Act. While the American public may have initially supported or at least acquiesced to the
detention provisions of the Patriot Act, almost two years have passed since the attacks of
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September 11, 2001. It is essential for the United States government to be mindful that these
detention provisions do not have to be permanent and to recognize that they most probably
should not be permanent. In other words, it is important to re-evaluate these provisions provided
the situation stabilizes. The United States government must remember that even those
emergency measures enacted in previous conflicts that most adversely compromised tradition
civil liberties—Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, FDR’s internment of JapaneseAmericans—were re-evaluated once the wars were won.430 Quite possibly, if history is any
indication, the current infringements on the civil liberties of non-citizens in the United States will
heighten our sensitivity so that our concern for civil liberties in the future will be far greater than
it is today.431
Conversely, the government of the United Kingdom did not strike any sort of balance
between protecting the basic civil liberties of non-citizens and guarding against any threat of
terrorism in the United Kingdom. Undoubtedly, in passing ATCSA, the United Kingdom had
the same goals as the United States. Detaining suspected terrorists using the disproportionate
detention measures under ATCSA, in the absence of any widely-perceived public emergency,
however, is not the answer. ATCSA is not a well thought-out and measured response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Given the United Kingdom’s vast history with
terrorism, the government was well aware of the alternative means of monitoring suspected
without denying them the basis principles of liberty and justice. This Comment is not arguing
that the government should be denied the powers it truly needs in order to defend the United
Kingdom’s national security, but these measures need to be strictly necessary, proportionate,
accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards as well as targeted at a true emergency situation
430
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which they were designed to improve. Unfortunately, the detention measures of ATCSA fail to
satisfy any of these criteria, and thus, cannot be justified.
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Appendix A
SEC. 411. DEFINITIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM
(a) GROUNDS OF INADMISSIBILITY. Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is amended–
(1) in subparagraph (B) –
(A) in clause (i) –
(i) by amending subclause (IV) to read as follows:
“(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of–
(aa) a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by the Secretary of State
under section 219, or
(bb) a political, social or other similar group whose public endorsement of
acts of terrorist activity the Secretary of State has determined undermines
United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities,”;
(ii) in subclause (V), by inserting “or” after “section 219,”; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following new subclauses:
“(VI) has used the alien's position of prominence within any country to
endorse or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support
terrorist activity or a terrorist organization, in a way that the Secretary of
State has determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or
eliminate terrorist activities, or
(VII) is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this
section, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible occurred
within the last 5 years,”;
(B) by redesignating clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) as clauses (iii), (iv), and (v),
respectively;
(C) in clause (i)(II), by striking "clause (iii)" and inserting "clause (iv)";
(D) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
“(ii) EXCEPTION.--Subclause (VII) of clause (i) does not apply to a
spouse or child-(I) who did not know or should not reasonably have known of the activity
causing the alien to be found inadmissible under this section; or
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(II) whom the consular officer or Attorney General has reasonable grounds
to believe has renounced the activity causing the alien to be found
inadmissible under this section.”;
(E) in clause (iii) (as redesignated by subparagraph (B)) –
(i) by inserting “it had been” before “committed in the United States”; and
(ii) in subclause (V)(b), by striking “or firearm" and inserting, “firearm, or
other weapon or dangerous device”;
(F) by amending clause (iv) (as redesignated by subparagraph (B)) to read as
follows:
”(iv) ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED.--As used in this
chapter, the term 'engage in terrorist activity' means, in an individual
capacity or as a member of an organization–
(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an
intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;"(III) to gather information on
potential targets for terrorist activity;
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for–
(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the
solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably
have known, that the solicitation would further the organization's terrorist
activity;
(V) to solicit any individual–
(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this clause;
(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I)
or (vi)(II); or
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause
(vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know, and
should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation would further the
organization's terrorist activity; or
(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know,
affords material support, including a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial
benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training-(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know,
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has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the actor
can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have
known, that the act would further the organization's terrorist activity.
This clause shall not apply to any material support the alien afforded to an
organization or individual that has committed terrorist activity, if the
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, or the
Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of State, concludes
in his sole unreviewable discretion, that this clause should not apply”; and
(G) by adding at the end the following new clause:
“(vi) TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DEFINED. As used in clause
(i)(VI) and clause (iv), the term 'terrorist organization' means an
organization–
(I) designated under section 219;
(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by the
Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the request of the Attorney
General, as a terrorist organization, after finding that the organization
engages in the activities described in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause
(iv), or that the organization provides material support to further terrorist
activity; or
(III) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not,
which engages in the activities described in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of
clause (iv)."; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
(F) ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.--Any alien
who the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General,
or the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of State,
determines has been associated with a terrorist organization and intends
while in the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in
activities that could endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United
States is inadmissible.”.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(1) Section 237(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(B))
is amended by striking “section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)” and inserting “section
212(a)(3)(B)(iv)”.
(2) Section 208(b)(2)(A)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1158(b)(2)(A)(v)) is amended by striking “or (IV)” and inserting “(IV), or (VI)”.
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(c) RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.
(1) IN GENERAL.--Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments
made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall
apply to–
(A) actions taken by an alien before, on, or after such date; and
(B) all aliens, without regard to the date of entry or attempted entry into the
United States–
(i) in removal proceedings on or after such date (except for proceedings in
which there has been a final administrative decision before such date); or
(ii) seeking admission to the United States on or after such date.
(2) SPECIAL RULE FOR ALIENS IN EXCLUSION OR DEPORTATION
PROCEEDINGS.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, sections 212(a)(3)(B)
and 237(a)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by this Act, shall
apply to all aliens in exclusion or deportation proceedings on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act (except for proceedings in which there has been a final
administrative decision before such date) as if such proceedings were removal
proceedings.
(3) SPECIAL RULE FOR SECTION 219 ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
DESIGNATED UNDER SECTION 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II)—
(A) IN GENERAL.--Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), no alien shall be
considered inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)), or deportable under section 237(a)(4)(B) of
such Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(B)), by reason of the amendments made by
subsection (a), on the ground that the alien engaged in a terrorist activity
described in subclause (IV)(bb), (V)(bb), or (VI)(cc) of section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)
of such Act (as so amended) with respect to a group at any time when the group
was not a terrorist organization designated by the Secretary of State under section
219 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) or otherwise designated under section
212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of such Act (as so amended).
(B) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed
to prevent an alien from being considered inadmissible or deportable for having
engaged in a terrorist activity(i) described in subclause (IV)(bb), (V)(bb), or (VI)(cc) of section
212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of such Act (as so amended) with respect to a terrorist

100

organization at any time when such organization was designated by the
Secretary of State under section 219 of such Act or otherwise designated
under section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II) of such Act (as so amended); or
(ii) described in subclause (IV)(cc), (V)(cc), or (VI)(dd) of section
212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of such Act (as so amended) with respect to a terrorist
organization described in section 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) of such Act (as so
amended).
(4) EXCEPTION.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney
General, may determine that the amendments made by this section shall not apply
with respect to actions by an alien taken outside the United States before the date
of the enactment of this Act upon the recommendation of a consular officer who
has concluded that there is not reasonable ground to believe that the alien knew or
reasonably should have known that the actions would further a terrorist activity.
(c) DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. Section 219(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) is amended–
(1) in paragraph (1)(B), by inserting “or terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2)
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22
U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)), or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist
activity or terrorism” after “212(a)(3)(B)”;
(2) in paragraph (1)(C), by inserting “or terrorism” after “terrorist activity”;
(3) by amending paragraph (2)(A) to read as follows:
“(A) NOTICE.
(i) TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS. Seven days before making a
designation under this subsection, the Secretary shall, by classified
communication, notify the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives, the President pro tempore, Majority Leader, and Minority
Leader of the Senate, and the members of the relevant committees of the
House of Representatives and the Senate, in writing, of the intent to
designate an organization under this subsection, together with the findings
made under paragraph (1) with respect to that organization, and the factual
basis therefor.
(ii) PUBLICATION IN FEDERAL REGISTER. The Secretary shall
publish the designation in the Federal Register seven days after providing
the notification under clause (i).”;
(4) in paragraph (2)(B)(i), by striking “subparagraph (A)” and inserting
“subparagraph (A)(ii)”;
(5) in paragraph (2)(C), by striking “paragraph (2)” and inserting “paragraph
(2)(A)(i)”;
(6) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking “subsection (c)” and inserting “subsection
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(b)”;
(7) in paragraph (4)(B), by inserting after the first sentence the following: “The
Secretary also may redesignate such organization at the end of any 2-year
redesignation period (but not sooner than 60 days prior to the termination of such
period) for an additional 2-year period upon a finding that the relevant
circumstances described in paragraph (1) still exist. Any redesignation shall be
effective immediately following the end of the prior 2- year designation or
redesignation period unless a different effective date is provided in such
redesignation.”;
(8) in paragraph (6)(A)(A) by inserting “or a redesignation made under paragraph (4)(B)” after
“paragraph (1)”;
(B) in clause (i) (i) by inserting “or redesignation” after “designation” the first place it
appears; and
(ii) by striking “of the designation”; and
(C) in clause (ii), by striking “of the designation”;
(9) in paragraph (6)(B) –
(A) by striking “through (4)” and inserting “and (3)”; and
(B) by inserting at the end the following new sentence: “Any revocation
shall take effect on the date specified in the revocation or upon publication
in the Federal Register if no effective date is specified.”;
(10) in paragraph (7), by inserting, “or the revocation of a redesignation under
paragraph (6),” after “paragraph (5) or (6)”; and
(11) in paragraph (8)—
(A) by striking “paragraph (1)(B)” and inserting “paragraph (2)(B), or if a
redesignation under this subsection has become effective under paragraph
(4)(B)”;
(B) by inserting “or an alien in a removal proceeding” after “criminal
action”; and
(C) by inserting “or redesignation” before “as a defense”.
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SEC. 412. MANDATORY DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS; HABEAS
CORPUS; JUDICIAL REVIEW.
(a) IN GENERAL. The Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 236 the following:
“MANDATORY DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS;
HABEAS CORPUS; JUDICIAL REVIEW
SEC. 236A. (a) DETENTION OF TERRORIST ALIENS
(1) CUSTODY. The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who is
certified under paragraph (3).
(2) RELEASE.--Except as provided in paragraphs (5) and (6), the Attorney
General shall maintain custody of such an alien until the alien is removed from
the United States. Except as provided in paragraph (6), such custody shall be
maintained irrespective of any relief from removal for which the alien may be
eligible, or any relief from removal granted the alien, until the Attorney General
determines that the alien is no longer an alien who may be certified under
paragraph (3). If the alien is finally determined not to be removable, detention
pursuant to this subsection shall terminate.
(3) CERTIFICATION.--The Attorney General may certify an alien under this
paragraph if the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe that the
alien—
(A) is described in section 212(a)(3)(A)(i), 212(a)(3)(A)(iii), 212(a)(3)(B),
237(a)(4)(A)(i), 237(a)(4)(A)(iii), or 237(a)(4)(B); or
(B) is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the
United States.
(4) NONDELEGATION. The Attorney General may delegate the authority
provided under paragraph (3) only to the Deputy Attorney General. The Deputy
Attorney General may not delegate such authority.
(5) COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. The Attorney General shall place
an alien detained under paragraph (1) in removal proceedings, or shall charge the
alien with a criminal offense, not later than 7 days after the commencement of
such detention. If the requirement of the preceding sentence is not satisfied, the
Attorney General shall release the alien.
(6) LIMITATION ON INDEFINITE DETENTION.--An alien detained solely
under paragraph (1) who has not been removed under section 241(a)(1)(A), and
whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be detained
for additional periods of up to six months only if the release of the alien will
threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community
or any person.
(7) REVIEW OF CERTIFICATION. The Attorney General shall review the
certification made under paragraph (3) every 6 months. If the Attorney General
determines, in the Attorney General's discretion, that the certification should be
revoked, the alien may be released on such conditions as the Attorney General
deems appropriate, unless such release is otherwise prohibited by law. The alien
may request each 6 months in writing that the Attorney General reconsider the
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certification and may submit documents or other evidence in support of that
request.
(b) HABEAS CORPUS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW.
(1) IN GENERAL. Judicial review of any action or decision relating to this
section (including judicial review of the merits of a determination made under
subsection (a)(3) or (a)(6)) is available exclusively in habeas corpus proceedings
consistent with this subsection. Except as provided in the preceding sentence, no
court shall have jurisdiction to review, by habeas corpus petition or otherwise, any
such action or decision.
(2) APPLICATION.
(A) IN GENERAL. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including section
2241(a) of title 28, United States Code, habeas corpus proceedings described in
paragraph (1) may be initiated only by an application filed with-(i) the Supreme Court;
(ii) any justice of the Supreme Court;
(iii) any circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit; or
(iv) any district court otherwise having jurisdiction to entertain it.
(B) APPLICATION TRANSFER.--Section 2241(b) of title 28, United States
Code, shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus described in
subparagraph (A).
(3) APPEALS.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including section
2253 of title 28, in habeas corpus proceedings described in paragraph (1) before a
circuit or district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. There
shall be no right of appeal in such proceedings to any other circuit court of
appeals.
(4) RULE OF DECISION.--The law applied by the Supreme Court and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall be
regarded as the rule of decision in habeas corpus proceedings described in
paragraph (1).
(c) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.--The provisions of this section shall not be
applicable to any other provision of this Act.”.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.--The table of contents of the Immigration and
Nationality Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 236 the
following:
“Sec. 236A. Mandatory detention of suspected terrorist; habeas corpus; judicial
review.”.
(c) REPORTS. Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
every 6 months thereafter, the Attorney General shall submit a report to the Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate, with respect to the reporting period, on—
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(1) the number of aliens certified under section 236A(a)(3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, as added by subsection (a);
(2) the grounds for such certifications;
(3) the nationalities of the aliens so certified;
(4) the length of the detention for each alien so certified; and
(5) the number of aliens so certified who—
(A) were granted any form of relief from removal;
(B) were removed;
(C) the Attorney General has determined are no longer aliens who may be so
certified; or
(D) were released from detention.
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Appendix B

PART 4
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
Suspected international terrorists

21

Suspected international terrorist: certification
(1) The Secretary of State may issue a certificate under this section in respect of a
person if the Secretary of State reasonably(a) believes that the person's presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to
national security, and
(b) suspects that the person is a terrorist.
(2) In subsection (1)(b) "terrorist" means a person who(a) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of
acts of international terrorism,
(b) is a member of or belongs to an international terrorist group, or
(c) has links with an international terrorist group.
(3) A group is an international terrorist group for the purposes of subsection (2)(b)
and (c) if(a) it is subject to the control or influence of persons outside the United
Kingdom, and
(b) the Secretary of State suspects that it is concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c) a person has links with an international
terrorist group only if he supports or assists it.
(5) In this Part"terrorism" has the meaning given by section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (c.
11), and
"suspected international terrorist" means a person certified under subsection
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(1).
(6) Where the Secretary of State issues a certificate under subsection (1) he shall as
soon as is reasonably practicable(a) take reasonable steps to notify the person certified, and
(b) send a copy of the certificate to the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission.
(7) The Secretary of State may revoke a certificate issued under subsection (1).
(8) A decision of the Secretary of State in connection with certification under this
section may be questioned in legal proceedings only under section 25 or 26.
(9) An action of the Secretary of State taken wholly or partly in reliance on a
certificate under this section may be questioned in legal proceedings only by or in the
course of proceedings under(a) section 25 or 26, or
(b) secton 2 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68)
(appeal).
22

Deportation, removal, &c.
(1) An action of a kind specified in subsection (2) may be taken in respect of a
suspected international terrorist despite the fact that (whether temporarily or
indefinitely) the action cannot result in his removal from the United Kingdom
because of(a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an international agreement,
or
(b) a practical consideration.
(2) The actions mentioned in subsection (1) are(a) refusing leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom in accordance
with provision made by or by virtue of any of sections 3 to 3B of the
Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (control of entry to United Kingdom),
(b) varying a limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom in
accordance with provision made by or by virtue of any of those sections,
(c) recommending deportation in accordance with section 3(6) of that Act
(recommendation by court),
(d) taking a decision to make a deportation order under section 5(1) of that
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Act (deportation by Secretary of State),
(e) making a deportation order under section 5(1) of that Act,
(f) refusing to revoke a deportation order,
(g) cancelling leave to enter the United Kingdom in accordance with
paragraph 2A of Schedule 2 to that Act (person arriving with continuous
leave),
(h) giving directions for a person's removal from the United Kingdom under
any of paragraphs 8 to 10 or 12 to 14 of Schedule 2 to that Act (control of
entry to United Kingdom),
(i) giving directions for a person's removal from the United Kingdom under
section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) (person
unlawfully in United Kingdom), and
(j) giving notice to a person in accordance with regulations under paragraph 1
of Schedule 4 to that Act of a decision to make a deportation order against
him.
(3) Action of a kind specified in subsection (2) which has effect in respect of a
suspected international terrorist at the time of his certification under section 21 shall
be treated as taken again (in reliance on subsection (1) above) immediately after
certification.
23

Detention
(1) A suspected international terrorist may be detained under a provision specified
in subsection (2) despite the fact that his removal or departure from the United
Kingdom is prevented (whether temporarily or indefinitely) by(a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an international agreement,
or
(b) a practical consideration.
(2) The provisions mentioned in subsection (1) are(a) paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (detention
of persons liable to examination or removal), and
(b) paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation).

24

Bail
(1) A suspected international terrorist who is detained under a provision of the
Immigration Act 1971 may be released on bail.
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(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) the following provisions of Schedule 2 to the
Immigration Act 1971 (control on entry) shall apply with the modifications specified
in Schedule 3 to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) (bail
to be determined by Special Immigration Appeals Commission) and with any other
necessary modifications(a) paragraph 22(1A), (2) and (3) (release),
(b) paragraph 23 (forfeiture),
(c) paragraph 24 (arrest), and
(d) paragraph 30(1) (requirement of Secretary of State's consent).
(3) Rules of procedure under the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act
1997 (c. 68)(a) may make provision in relation to release on bail by virtue of this section,
and
(b) subject to provision made by virtue of paragraph (a), shall apply in relation
to release on bail by virtue of this section as they apply in relation to release
on bail by virtue of that Act subject to any modification which the
Commission considers necessary.
25

Certification: appeal
(1) A suspected international terrorist may appeal to the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission against his certification under section 21.
(2) On an appeal the Commission must cancel the certificate if(a) it considers that there are no reasonable grounds for a belief or suspicion of
the kind referred to in section 21(1)(a) or (b), or
(b) it considers that for some other reason the certificate should not have been
issued.
(3) If the Commission determines not to cancel a certificate it must dismiss the
appeal.
(4) Where a certificate is cancelled under subsection (2) it shall be treated as never
having been issued.
(5) An appeal against certification may be commenced only(a) within the period of three months beginning with the date on which the
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certificate is issued, or
(b) with the leave of the Commission, after the end of that period but before
the commencement of the first review under section 26.
26

Certification: review
(1) The Special Immigration Appeals Commission must hold a first review of each
certificate issued under section 21 as soon as is reasonably practicable after the expiry
of the period of six months beginning with the date on which the certificate is issued.
(2) But(a) in a case where before the first review would fall to be held in accordance
with subsection (1) an appeal under section 25 is commenced (whether or not
it is finally determined before that time) or leave to appeal is given under
section 25(5)(b), the first review shall be held as soon as is reasonably
practicable after the expiry of the period of six months beginning with the date
on which the appeal is finally determined, and
(b) in a case where an application for leave under section 25(5)(b) has been
commenced but not determined at the time when the first review would fall to
be held in accordance with subsection (1), if leave is granted the first review
shall be held as soon as is reasonably practicable after the expiry of the period
of six months beginning with the date on which the appeal is finally
determined.
(3) The Commission must review each certificate issued under section 21 as soon
as is reasonably practicable after the expiry of the period of three months beginning
with the date on which the first review or a review under this subsection is finally
determined.
(4) The Commission may review a certificate during a period mentioned in
subsection (1), (2) or (3) if(a) the person certified applies for a review, and
(b) the Commission considers that a review should be held because of a
change in circumstance.
(5) On a review the Commission(a) must cancel the certificate if it considers that there are no reasonable
grounds for a belief or suspicion of the kind referred to in section 21(1)(a) or
(b), and
(b) otherwise, may not make any order (save as to leave to appeal).
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(6) A certificate cancelled by order of the Commission under subsection (5) ceases
to have effect at the end of the day on which the order is made.
(7) Where the Commission reviews a certificate under subsection (4), the period for
determining the next review of the certificate under subsection (3) shall begin with
the date of the final determination of the review under subsection (4).
27

Appeal and review: supplementary
(1) The following provisions of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act
1997 (c. 68) shall apply in relation to an appeal or review under section 25 or 26 as
they apply in relation to an appeal under section 2 of that Act(a) section 6 (person to represent appellant's interests),
(b) section 7 (further appeal on point of law), and
(c) section 7A (pending appeal).
(2) The reference in subsection (1) to an appeal or review does not include a
reference to a decision made or action taken on or in connection with(a) an application under section 25(5)(b) or 26(4)(a) of this Act, or
(b) subsection (8) below.
(3) Subsection (4) applies where(a) a further appeal is brought by virtue of subsection (1)(b) in connection
with an appeal or review, and
(b) the Secretary of State notifies the Commission that in his opinion the
further appeal is confined to calling into question one or more derogation
matters within the meaning of section 30 of this Act.
(4) For the purpose of the application of section 26(2) and (3) of this Act the
determination by the Commission of the appeal or review in connection with which
the further appeal is brought shall be treated as a final determination.
(5) Rules under section 5 or 8 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act
1997 (general procedure; and leave to appeal) may make provision about an appeal,
review or application under section 25 or 26 of this Act.
(6) Subject to any provision made by virtue of subsection (5), rules under section 5
or 8 of that Act shall apply in relation to an appeal, review or application under
section 25 or 26 of this Act with any modification which the Commission considers
necessary.
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(7) Subsection (8) applies where the Commission considers that an appeal or
review under section 25 or 26 which relates to a person's certification under section
21 is likely to raise an issue which is also likely to be raised in other proceedings
before the Commission which relate to the same person.
(8) The Commission shall so far as is reasonably practicable(a) deal with the two sets of proceedings together, and
(b) avoid or minimise delay to either set of proceedings as a result of
compliance with paragraph (a).
(9) Cancellation by the Commission of a certificate issued under section 21 shall
not prevent the Secretary of State from issuing another certificate, whether on the
grounds of a change of circumstance or otherwise.
(10) The reference in section 81 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33)
(grants to voluntary organisations) to persons who have rights of appeal under that
Act shall be treated as including a reference to suspected international terrorists.
28

Review of sections 21 to 23
(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint a person to review the operation of sections
21 to 23.
(2) The person appointed under subsection (1) shall review the operation of those
sections not later than(a) the expiry of the period of 14 months beginning with the day on which this
Act is passed;
(b) one month before the expiry of a period specified in accordance with
section 29(2)(b) or (c).
(3) Where that person conducts a review under subsection (2) he shall send a report
to the Secretary of State as soon as is reasonably practicable.
(4) Where the Secretary of State receives a report under subsection (3) he shall lay
a copy of it before Parliament as soon as is reasonably practicable.
(5) The Secretary of State may make payments to a person appointed under
subsection (1).
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29

Duration of sections 21 to 23
(1) Sections 21 to 23 shall, subject to the following provisions of this section,
expire at the end of the period of 15 months beginning with the day on which this Act
is passed.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order(a) repeal sections 21 to 23;
(b) revive those sections for a period not exceeding one year;
(c) provide that those sections shall not expire in accordance with subsection
(1) or an order under paragraph (b) or this paragraph, but shall continue in
force for a period not exceeding one year.
(3) An order under subsection (2)(a) must be made by statutory instrument, and
(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by
resolution of each House of Parliament.
(4) An order may be made without compliance with subsection (3)(b) if it contains
a declaration by the Secretary of State that by reason of urgency it is necessary to
make the order without laying a draft before Parliament; in which case the order(a) must be laid before Parliament, and
(b) shall cease to have effect at the end of the period specified in subsection
(5) unless the order is approved during that period by resolution of each House
of Parliament.
(5) The period referred to in subsection (4)(b) is the period of 40 days(a) beginning with the day on which the order is made, and
(b) ignoring any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or
during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.
(6) The fact that an order ceases to have effect by virtue of subsection (4)(a) shall not affect the lawfulness of anything done before the order ceases to
have effect, and
(b) shall not prevent the making of a new order.
(7) Sections 21 to 23 shall by virtue of this subsection cease to have effect at the
end of 10th November 2006.
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30

Legal proceedings: derogation
(1) In this section "derogation matter" means(a) a derogation by the United Kingdom from Article 5(1) of the Convention
on Human Rights which relates to the detention of a person where there is an
intention to remove or deport him from the United Kingdom, or
(b) the designation under section 14(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)
of a derogation within paragraph (a) above.
(2) A derogation matter may be questioned in legal proceedings only before the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission; and the Commission(a) is the appropriate tribunal for the purpose of section 7 of the Human Rights
Act 1998 in relation to proceedings all or part of which call a derogation
matter into question; and
(b) may hear proceedings which could, but for this subsection, be brought in
the High Court or the Court of Session.
(3) In relation to proceedings brought by virtue of subsection (2)(a) section 6 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c.
68) (person to represent appellant's interests) shall apply with the reference to
the appellant being treated as a reference to any party to the proceedings,
(b) rules under section 5 or 8 of that Act (general procedure; and leave to
appeal) shall apply with any modification which the Commission considers
necessary, and
(c) in the case of proceedings brought by virtue of subsection (2)(b), the
Commission may do anything which the High Court may do (in the case of
proceedings which could have been brought in that court) or which the Court
of Session may do (in the case of proceedings which could have been brought
in that court).
(4) The Commission's power to award costs (or, in Scotland, expenses) by virtue of
subsection (3)(c) may be exercised only in relation to such part of proceedings before
it as calls a derogation matter into question.
(5) In relation to proceedings brought by virtue of subsection (2)(a) or (b)(a) an appeal may be brought to the appropriate appeal court (within the
meaning of section 7 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act
1997 (c. 68)) with the leave of the Commission or, if that leave is refused,
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with the leave of the appropriate appeal court, and
(b) the appropriate appeal court may consider and do only those things which
it could consider and do in an appeal brought from the High Court or the
Court of Session in proceedings for judicial review.
(6) In relation to proceedings which are entertained by the Commission under
subsection (2) but are not brought by virtue of subsection (2)(a) or (b), subsection (4)
shall apply in so far as the proceedings call a derogation matter into question.
(7) In this section "the Convention on Human Rights" has the meaning given to
"the Convention" by section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42).
31

Interpretation
A reference in section 22, 23 or 24 to a provision of the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77)
includes a reference to that provision as applied by(a) another provision of that Act, or
(b) another Act.

32

Channel Islands and Isle of Man
Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that sections 21 to 31 shall extend, with
such modifications as appear to Her Majesty to be appropriate, to any of the Channel
Islands or the Isle of Man.

Refugee Convention
33

Certificate that Convention does not apply
(1) This section applies to an asylum appeal before the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission where the Secretary of State issues a certificate that(a) the appellant is not entitled to the protection of Article 33(1) of the
Refugee Convention because Article 1(F) or 33(2) applies to him (whether or
not he would be entitled to protection if that Article did not apply), and
(b) the removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would be
conducive to the public good.
(2) In this section"asylum appeal" means an appeal under section 2 of the Special Immigration
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Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) in which the appellant makes a claim
for asylum (within the meaning given by section 167(1) of the Immigration
and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33)), and
"the Refugee Convention" has the meaning given by that section.
(3) Where this section applies the Commission must begin its substantive
deliberations on the asylum appeal by considering the statements in the Secretary of
State's certificate.
(4) If the Commission agrees with those statements it must dismiss such part of the
asylum appeal as amounts to a claim for asylum (before considering any other aspect
of the case).
(5) If the Commission does not agree with those statements it must quash the
decision or action against which the asylum appeal is brought.
(6) Where a decision or action is quashed under subsection (5)(a) the quashing shall not prejudice any later decision or action, whether taken
on the grounds of a change of circumstance or otherwise, and
(b) the claim for asylum made in the course of the asylum appeal shall be
treated for the purposes of section 15 of the Immigration and Asylum Act
1999 (interim protection from removal) as undecided until it has been
determined whether to take a new decision or action of the kind quashed.
(7) The Secretary of State may revoke a certificate issued under subsection (1).
(8) No court may entertain proceedings for questioning(a) a decision or action of the Secretary of State in connection with
certification under subsection (1),
(b) a decision of the Secretary of State in connection with a claim for asylum
(within the meaning given by section 167(1) of the Immigration and Asylum
Act 1999) in a case in respect of which he issues a certificate under subsection
(1) above, or
(c) a decision or action of the Secretary of State taken as a consequence of the
dismissal of all or part of an asylum appeal in pursuance of subsection (4).
(9) Subsection (8) shall not prevent an appeal under section 7 of the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (appeal on point of law).
(10) Her Majesty may by Order in Council direct that this section shall extend, with
such modifications as appear to Her Majesty to be appropriate, to any of the Channel
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Islands or the Isle of Man.
34

Construction
(1) Articles 1(F) and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention (exclusions: war criminals,
national security, &c.) shall not be taken to require consideration of the gravity of(a) events or fear by virtue of which Article 1(A) would or might apply to a
person if Article 1(F) did not apply, or
(b) a threat by reason of which Article 33(1) would or might apply to a person
if Article 33(2) did not apply.
(2) In this section "the Refugee Convention" means the Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28th July 1951 and the Protocol to the
Convention.

Special Immigration Appeals Commission
35

Status of Commission
At the end of section 1 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c.
68) insert"(3) The Commission shall be a superior court of record.
(4) A decision of the Commission shall be questioned in legal proceedings
only in accordance with(a) section 7, or
(b) section 30(5)(a) of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001 (derogation)."
Fingerprints

36

Destruction of fingerprints
(1) In section 143 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) (destruction of
fingerprints)(a) subsections (3) to (8) (requirement to destroy fingerprints on resolution of
asylum and immigration cases) shall cease to have effect,
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(b) in subsection (9) (dependants) after "F" insert "(within the meaning of
section 141(7))", and
(c) subsection (14) (interpretation) shall cease to have effect.
(2) Subsection (1)(a) shall have effect in relation to fingerprints whether taken before or after the
coming into force of this section, and
(b) in relation to fingerprints which before the coming into force of this
section were required by section 143 to be destroyed, shall be treated as
having had effect before the requirement arose.
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